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Abstract 
As the threat of climate change impacts looms, with global temperatures rising 
to 1.5oC as early as 2030, the need for rapid low-carbon energy transition is more 
urgent than ever. As a global leader in climate change negotiations, the EU has 
committed to become carbon neutral by 2050 and hydrogen is set to play a critical role 
in decarbonising sectors which are difficult to electrify such as freight transport, 
energy-intensive industries required high-grade heat and power generation sectors. 
This offers an opportunity for Norway to mitigate the risk of declining demand and 
supply of its fossil-fuel based energy exports. This thesis provides an overview of the 
key drivers and barriers that could affect the prospects of blue and green hydrogen 
export in Norway. Given that transitions, in general, do not follow a linear-process, the 
thesis uses exploratory scenarios as a framework to enhance the understanding of 
how the interplay of these drivers could affect the trajectories of the pathways of blue 
and green hydrogen developments in Norway. The findings and analysis show that 
Norway is well-positioned in terms of natural resources availability, existing compatible 
infrastructure and technological expertise for the development of both types of 
hydrogen and has a great potential for becoming a market leader in the export of 
hydrogen. As its natural gas reserves deplete, the role of green hydrogen in a low-
carbon energy system is likely grow more significantly. Therefore, it is critical for 
policymakers to consider the eventual phase-out of blue hydrogen and scaling up of 
green hydrogen in its strategy as early as possible. Overall, blue hydrogen should be 
viewed as a short-term solution to enable a rapid hydrogen transition, but green 
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The prospects for blue and green hydrogen as energy export for Norway 
1.0 Introduction 
Based on the latest IPCC estimates, global warming is likely to reach 1.5oC as 
early as 2030 (Allen et al., 2018). In order to limit global warming to 1.5oC, the global 
net emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) will need to be reduced by 45% by 2030 
compared to 2010 levels and achieve ‘net zero’ levels around 2050 (Allen et al., 2018). 
According to the fifth assessment report of the IPCC, about 78% of the total increase 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emission between 1970 and 2010 is attributed to CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (IPCC, 2014). In 2010, 
70% of the global GHG emissions were attributed to the energy supply sector (35%), 
the industry (21%) and the transport sector (14%) (IPCC, 2014). 
Recognizing that a global effort is paramount to combatting climate change, as 
of 27th Aug 2019, 185 governments around the world have united together through the 
ratification of the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2019), to undertake ambitious 
efforts to “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2oC 
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 2). At the forefront of 
the international climate negotiations is the European Union (EU), who is also the third 
largest CO2 emitter after USA and China since 2002 (Muntean et al., 2018). Owing to 
the increasing share of RE in the final energy consumption mix and energy efficiency 
improvements (European Commission, 2014), the GHG emissions in 2017 by the 
European Union (EU) were lower than 1990 levels by 19.5% (Muntean et al., 2018), 
indicating that it is well on track to meet its 2020 targets for GHG reduction of 20% by 
2020. The positive developments led to a revision of the 2030 climate and energy 
framework in 2018 in the target share for RE in the final energy consumption mix (from 
27% to 32%) and the improvement target for improvement in energy efficiency (from 
27% to 32.5%), while maintaining the GHG reduction target of 40% by 2030. As a 
long-term strategy, the EU envisions to become the first major economy to be carbon 
neutral by 2050, which is compatible with the findings of the IPCC special report on 
1.5oC on the requirements to meet the Paris Agreement targets (Climate Action 
Tracker, 2018). 
Concerned with the costs and risks to energy supply security due to a rapidly 
growing energy demand which is highly dependent on fast-depleting fossil fuel 
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resources that are mostly imported from politically unstable sources (such as oil from 
the Middle East and natural gas from Russia), the EU is inherently motivated to reach 
the targets it has set for itself (Pacesila, Burcea, & Colesca, 2016). Moreover, unlike 
the Paris Agreement, under the RE and energy efficiency directives, the EU Climate 
and Energy framework targets are binding for its members. As such, it is likely that 
RE’s share in the final energy demand mix will continue to increase as more sectors 
become electrified. If so, the fate of the oil and gas sector in Norway would seem 
uncertain given that 72% of its oil exports and 95% of its natural gas exports are 
dependent on EU demand (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019d). This could 
have a significant consequence on Norway’s economy since 50% of its total exports 
in 2018 was based on this sector, which contributed to 17% of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018d). 
Given its economic importance, it is no surprise that natural gas exports bear 
significant importance in the Norwegian political agenda to promote natural gas as a 
transition energy source as Europe moves away from coal towards a RE-based future, 
which forms the key justification for further oil and gas exploration in the Arctic (Safari, 
Das, Langhelle, Roy, & Assadi, 2019). However, faced with increasing competition 
from RE in a carbon-constrained world, the future of natural gas in Norway is at stake 
and begets the question of how long this transition is expected to last before being 
substituted by alternative low carbon energy sources. As Jim Watson, the director of 
the UK Energy Research Centre, pointed out “…in the UK we have been using gas as 
a transition fuel since the 1970s. It has stopped being a solution and will become a 
problem without carbon capture” (Dempsey, 2019). While increasing the domestic use 
of natural gas in Norway is favoured by some politicians, it is highly disputed since 
substituting energy generated by 96% hydropower and 2% by wind power with natural 
gas would increase Norway’s carbon emissions and conflicts with its climate change 
commitments (IEA, 2017; Statistics Norway, 2018a). The resignation of the coalition 
government in 2000 over gas-fired power plants and climate change concerns 
demonstrates the importance of the issue at the parliamentary level and would ensure 
that domestic use of natural gas remain limited unless carbon capture storage (CCS) 
is employed.  
Meanwhile, Norway’s hydrocarbon reserves are estimated to peak in mid-
2020s based on today’s production rate (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c). 
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Half of the undiscovered hydrocarbon resources of Norway is estimated to lie in the 
little-explored Barents Sea, whose geology is fairly unknown, thus increasing 
significantly the risk of not finding a commercially viable well. This risk is further 
amplified when one takes into consideration of more complicated structure of the wells 
in the Barents Seas, bringing average cost of exploration in the Barents Sea to around 
300 million NOK per well, compared to around 200 million NOK per well in the North 
Sea (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c). 
While the energy supply sector continues to experience accelerating growth of 
RE, about one third of the global energy-related GHG are being emitted by sectors 
that are difficult to decarbonize through electrification such as energy-intensive 
industries that require high-grade heat and the freight transport sector due to current 
limitations of batteries (IRENA, 2018b, 2018a). For these sectors, hydrogen could 
become a cost-effective solution for deep decarbonization, and could potentially meet 
18% of the global final energy demand by 2050, that is about 78 exajoules (EJ) 
(Hydrogen Council, 2017; IRENA, 2018b). According to the Hydrogen Council, the 
largest industry-led initiative to develop the hydrogen economy, of which partially-
state-owned energy company, Equinor (former Statoil) is a steering member, the 
transport and industry sector is expected to account for almost half of this demand 




Hydrogen generation market is estimated to be valued at $115.25 billion USD 
in 2017 and it is expected to increase to $154.74 billion in USD in 2022 (De Valladares, 
2017). Globally, the 50 million tons of hydrogen per year is being used for ammonia 
production while 35% is being used to refine oil which contributes to GHG emission 
cuts (Hanley, Deane, & Gallachóir, 2018). As applications of hydrogen expand to other 
sectors such as passenger and freight transport, power and heat, and other industries, 
the demand for hydrogen is expected to soar. According to the technology outlook for 
hydrogen by Hydrogen Council (2017) and IRENA (2018b), the main source of 
demand for hydrogen will come from the transport sector. 
As the EU transitions towards a carbon neutral society in 2050, the future of 
Norway’s economy, which is highly dependent on EU’s demand for its petroleum 
resources, faces great uncertainties. To complicate things further, its current 
hydrocarbon reserves is reported to be fast-depleting and without further exploration 
in the Barents Sea, where half of the remaining undiscovered hydrocarbon resources 
lie, Norway’s economy is at stake. As such, Norway needs to quickly restructure its 
economy to adapt to the imminent changes in energy demand in the EU. One of the 
potential markets that Norway can tap into is the hydrogen fuel export market, where 
Norway has an advantage over its European neighbours for the production of both 
blue hydrogen (due to its access to large volumes of natural gas resources and large-
scale geological carbon storage sites, as well as to its leadership in CCS technology 
implementation), and green hydrogen (attributed to its access to vast amount of water 
resources and relatively lower cost of electricity from hydropower). Against this 
background, the objective of the thesis is to address the following research questions 
(RQ): 
RQ 1. What are the prospects of green and blue hydrogen in Norway for energy 
export? 
RQ 2. How will hydrogen affect the regime and interact with the broader energy 
landscape? 
To deal with the complexity of energy systems and the large uncertainties about 
the future pathways of hydrogen in addressing the above-mentioned questions, the 
development of multiple scenarios is useful for enhancing the understanding of the 
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broader energy landscape by way of capturing the plurality of views expressed by 
multiple key actors of how the future of hydrogen may unfold in Norway (O’Brien, 2004). 
O’Brien (2004, p. 709) defines a scenario as “a story of how the future might turn out” 
and it “denotes the future of external environment”. Scenarios can be used as a way 
to describe and assess how future uncertainties can impact them (O’Brien, 2004). 
While scenarios provide depictions of possible futures, it is important to note that they 
are not meant to be predictions of the future (Martinot, Dienst, Weiliang, & Qimin, 2007; 
McDowall, 2016). 
As described by Coates (2016, p.99), the “great value of a scenario is being 
able to take complex elements and weave them into a story which is coherent, 
systematic, comprehensive, and plausible.” By using scenarios as a framework, the 
prospects of emerging technologies like hydrogen fuel could be better visualized in 
economic, social and environmental terms, which could lead to better mobilization of 
key resources that are vital for its implementation (Mcdowall & Eames, 2006). 
In the next section, a background on the hydrogen export infrastructure is 
presented. This is followed by Section 4, which provides a description of the theories 
used in the analysis. Section 5 lays out the research design and methodology of the 
thesis. Section 6 is divided into 6 sub-sections that corresponds to the PESTEL 
framework (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal), which 
focuses on the key factors affecting the prospects of large-scale production of blue 
and green hydrogen in Norway. Section 7 will draw on some of the factors mentioned 
in Section 6 to build the scenarios for analysing and discussing the prospective 
pathways of blue and green hydrogen in Norway, how the energy regime maybe 
affected by hydrogen and how the changes interact with the broader energy landscape, 
as well as identify conditions that may affect the broader energy landscape. Section 8 








3.0 Background on hydrogen 
With a higher energy content by weight than natural gas and gasoline (three 
times more), hydrogen is an attractive fuel not only for transport applications, but also 
for applications in other sectors, heat, industry and power generation sector  (IEA, 
2019c; World Energy Council, 2019). While hydrogen is the most abundant element 
in the universe, it does not exist in free form in nature (IEA, 2019c; World Energy 
Council, 2019). Like electricity, hydrogen is an energy carrier and can be extracted via 
a production process which varies according to the type of feedstock used and the 
energy source (IEA, 2019c; World Energy Council, 2019). With a low-carbon 
production process, hydrogen could play a significant role in reducing global carbon 
emissions and our dependency on fossil fuels. 
While hydrogen is a non-toxic gas, it is odourless and its flame is invisible to 
the naked eye when burning, which makes it more difficult for people to detect fire and 
leaks, and understandably raises some safety concerns considering that it is highly 
flammable (IEA, 2019c). Fortunately, hydrogen has been produced and used 
industrially for decades. In Norway, large-scale production of hydrogen began since 
1927 for the purpose of manufacturing ammonia fertilizer, methanol and oil refining 
processes (Aarnes, Haugom, Norheim, Dugstad, & Ellassen, 2019). Norway not only 
has the know-how of producing large volumes of hydrogen and is experienced in 
establishing safe handling protocols to ensure a safe production environment. 
Since hydrogen is available everywhere, it can technically be produced 
anywhere. However, the ability to produce large volumes of it at a reasonable cost 
depends on the resources and the infrastructure that the country has at its disposition. 
In the case for Norway, the country is well-endowed with hydrocarbons resources, of 
which the natural gas mix is increasing year-on-year. The domestic use of natural gas 
is very limited due to the availability of near 100% green electricity which can more 
than meet the current domestic energy consumption and produce electricity cheaply. 
As such, the gas pipelines in Norway were built for export purposes, linking Norway to 
Europe through UK, France, Germany and Belgium (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2019h). Taking these into consideration, the next section will highlight the pathways 
that are most relevant for Norway. 
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3.1 Hydrogen export infrastructure 
As the distance between Norway and the importing country has major 
consequences on the cost of transport, and thus cost of hydrogen, it follows that the 
market with the highest profitability for Norway to export hydrogen would be the EU. 
With the EU as the key trading partner, this thesis identifies three pathways illustrated 
in Figure 1, as the most relevant for exploring Norway’s prospects for the export of 
blue and green hydrogen. The first pathway is to produce blue hydrogen in the 
importing EU country with the natural gas imported from Norway. While the production 
of hydrogen does not take place in Norway, this thesis considers this as a Norwegian 
export product when the production process is co-managed by the same Norwegian-
based company that exports the natural gas as feedstock1. The second pathway is to 
produce blue hydrogen using natural gas in Norway before exporting it to the importing 
country via hydrogen pipelines that are either repurposed from natural gas pipelines 
or built from scratch or by ship. The third pathway is by using RE electricity to produce 
green hydrogen in Norway and to export it to the importing country either via the newly 
built hydrogen pipelines or by ship. 
  
Figure 1: A simplified and non-exhaustive diagram of hydrogen export pathways from Norway to the 
EU. Adapted from Aarnes et al. (2019); IEA (2019c); Staffell et al. (2019). 
                                                        
1 The pathway of hydrogen production in importing country using green electricity imported from Norway is 
ruled out due to the risk of contamination of fossil fuel-based electricity in the electricity grid and the 
unlikelihood of a direct electricity cable connection from Norway to the production plant.  
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3.2 Hydrogen production 
Currently, more than 95% of hydrogen produced globally is based on fossil fuel, 
with steam methane reforming (SMR) being the most common production method 
(around 48%), followed by partial oxidation (POX) of crude oil products (30%) and coal 
gasification (18%) (IEA, 2015; IRENA, 2018b; Staffell et al., 2019; Voldsund, Jordal, 
& Anantharaman, 2016). When coal, natural gas or lignite are used as feedstock for 
producing hydrogen, the corresponding type of hydrogen produced are called “black 
hydrogen”, “grey hydrogen” and “brown hydrogen” respectively (IEA, 2019c). There 
are three reforming methods of natural gas: SMR (where water is used as the oxidant 
and a source of hydrogen), POX (which uses oxygen in the air as the oxidant) and 
auto thermal reforming (ATR) (which is a combination of SMR and POX) (IEA, 2019c).  
In order for hydrogen fuel to be considered as part of the solution in the energy 
transition, it needs to be produced using clean energy sources. In the context of 
Norway, one way to produce climate-friendly hydrogen at large-scale is by extraction 
from natural gas by using SMR or ATR coupled with CCS technology. This type of 
hydrogen is referred to as “blue hydrogen”. Hydrogen produced using the standard 
SMR method is generally of a lower purity level at 95% and is suitable for energy 
production use (van Cappellen, Croezen, & Rooijers, 2018). If blue hydrogen is to be 
used as feedstock for industrial use or fuel cell applications in the transport sector, a 
purification process is required to achieve the standard purity level which is set at 
99.95% and 100% respectively (van Cappellen et al., 2018).  
The other established method of producing carbon-lean hydrogen, but 
accounting for only around 4% of current global production, is electrolysis, in which 
electricity is used to split hydrogen from oxygen in water (IRENA, 2018b). Provided 
that the electricity is generated using RE, hydrogen generated using this method is 
called “green hydrogen” (Statkraft, 2018, p. 19). Since water electrolysis generates 
hydrogen at purity level of up to 99.9 to 100%, a purification process is not needed. In 
order for green hydrogen to be price-competitive, access to cheap electricity from RE 
sources and abundant water resources is paramount. Having one of the cheapest and 
greenest electricity in Europe, as well as an abundant supply of water resources, 
Norway has a natural advantage over its neighbours to produce green hydrogen more 
cost effectively.  
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3.3 Hydrogen storage 
In order to optimize the production capacity of hydrogen and ensure supply 
security, hydrogen storage is needed to overcome the problem of a mismatch between 
demand and supply. Currently, there exists technologies that enables storage of 
hydrogen in the form of gas, liquid or solid. However, given that the technology for 
hydrogen storage in the solid state by way of metal hydrides is at currently an early 
stage, it is unlikely to play an important role in the hydrogen infrastructure in the 
foreseeable future (Hart et al., 2015).  Before storage, hydrogen gas needs to be 
compressed (gaseous state) or liquefied (liquid state) to achieve higher energy 
densities (van Cappellen et al., 2018). Further, when stored as a liquid, additional 
energy is required for gasification before distribution to the consumer’s end (van 
Cappellen et al., 2018).  
Short-term hydrogen storage helps to buffer for intraday differences, while long-
term hydrogen storage is meant to buffer for large-scale and intra-seasonal variations. 
For the purpose of export,  the storage vessels need to have a large storage capacity 
and light weight so as to lower the transportation cost (Zhang, Zhao, Niu, & Maddy, 
2016). For short-term bulk storage in the gaseous state, hydrogen pipelines, either 
repurposed from existing natural gas pipelines or newly built from scratch, can be used 
to store compressed hydrogen gas (CGH2), whereas in the liquid state, options include 
liquid hydrogen (LH2) tank containers, large-scale LH2 storage tanks, liquid ammonia 
tanks or liquid organic hydrogen carrier2 (LOHC) tanks (IEA, 2019c; van Cappellen et 
al., 2018).  
CGH2 tanks are generally used for small-scale hydrogen storage for domestic 
applications, but they are not suited for the eventual transportation by ship due to the 
limited storage capacity and large storage vessels would be very costly due to the 
requirement of strong materials to ensure vessel integrity (Hart et al., 2015; Zhang et 
al., 2016). Therefore, this option is excluded from consideration in the discussion 
(Staffell et al., 2019; van Cappellen et al., 2018). The storage of LH2 in cryogenic tank 
containers is also discounted from the export value chain due to the restrictions on the 
storage quantities on-board commercial cargo ships and the requirement for LH2 to be 
                                                        
2 LOHC is a chemical that can be “’charged’ with hydrogen and then ‘discharged’”, acting as “a carrier 
liquid for hydrogen” (Hart et al., 2015, p. 133). 
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stowed only on top deck, under the International Code for Construction and Equipment 
of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code) and the International Maritime 
Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) (Hylaw, n.d.; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). 
The same applies for LOHC tanks, as the technology is currently at a nascent stage 
and unlikely to play a consequential role in the hydrogen infrastructure in the 
foreseeable future (Hart et al., 2015). 
For long-term and large-scale storage of hydrogen, options include salt caverns 
and depleted natural gas or oil reservoirs (IEA, 2019c). Hydrogen storage in 
underground salt caverns is well-established practices in the USA and in the UK (IEA, 
2019c). However, this option is not available for Norway as there are no known salt 
caverns in the region that can be exploited. Alternatively, Norway could store hydrogen 
in depleted natural gas and oil reservoirs which are typically larger than salt caverns, 
but they may be more susceptible to hydrogen leakages and contamination from 
organic reactions between hydrocarbons and the hydrogen stored (IEA, 2019c; van 
Cappellen et al., 2018). As such, the long-term geological storage of hydrogen in 
Norway has been excluded from consideration in this thesis. 
3.4 Hydrogen transport 
For blue hydrogen export, the most cost efficient way is to export natural gas 
through the existing pipelines as feedstock for hydrogen production with CCS at/or 
nearer to the site of use (Wietschel & Hasenauer, 2007). Equinor is currently 
partnering with Gasunie (Dutch energy network operator) and Vattenfall (Swedish 
energy company) to convert Vattendfall’s Magnum gas power plant in Eemshaven 
(Netherlands) to a hydrogen-powered plant, where hydrogen is produced on site using 
the imported gas from Norway via ATR and CCS process (Equinor ASA, 2017). This 
business model offers two business opportunities: 1) it allows Norway to continue 
exporting natural gas and 2) Norway could sell carbon storage space in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) to EU countries, assuming the legal barriers posed by the 
London Protocol can be overcome (see section 5.6 for details). 
For domestically-produced hydrogen (both blue and green), two transport 
vessels exist: hydrogen gas pipelines or ship. For distances below 1500 km, the most 
economical option is to transport CGH2 via hydrogen gas pipelines (IEA, 2019c). 
Without any conversion of the existing natural gas pipelines, the maximum blend of 
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hydrogen is at 20% (van Cappellen et al., 2018). Therefore, existing natural gas 
pipelines needs to be converted or new hydrogen pipelines needs to be built in order 
to export 100% pure hydrogen via pipelines (van Cappellen et al., 2018). 
For longer distances (above 1500 km), it would be more cost-effective to export 
hydrogen by ship in the form of liquid ammonia than in the form of LH2 as the former 
can leverage on existing infrastructure to be transported on chemical and semi-




This section aims to introduce the background and concepts of the two theories 
that will be used in the analysis and discussion of the prospects of blue and green 
hydrogen in Norway: Scenario framework and the multi-level perspective (MLP). 
Combining both theories results in a two-dimensional matrix that leads to four main 
themes corresponding to the typical pathways taken by niche-innovations under the 
influence of various conditions as prescribed by the MLP. This matrix is elaborated on 
in Section 3.3. 
4.1 Scenario framework 
Scenarios have long been used as a tool to indirectly explore the future of 
society and its institutions, especially in the military where scenarios were used as a 
strategic planning tool by military strategists in the form of war game simulations 
(Bradfield, Wright, Burt, Cairns, & Van Der Heijden, 2005). The need for a 
methodology to capture the consensus of opinion of a large and diverse group of 
experts reliably and to develop simulation models for exploring various policy options 
and their implications in future environments in the US Department of Defence after 
the Second World War gave rise to the development of modern-day scenario planning 
techniques by Herman Kahn, ‘father’ of modern-day scenario planning and former 
ranking authority on Civil Defence and strategic planning at the RAND (short for 
Research and Development) Corporation (Bradfield et al., 2005). While the scenario 
methodology was initially used as a policy planning tool, scenario planning became 
widely used in the business context after it proved to be a useful tool for the Royal 
Dutch Shell company to successfully overcome the oil crisis in the early 1970s 
(Bradfield et al., 2005; O’Brien, 2004). The ‘Shell approach’ to scenarios is also known 
as the Intuitive-Logics methodology, where the scenario logics are often defined in the 
form of matrices and organized around themes and all the generated scenarios are 
assumed to be equally probable (Bradfield et al., 2005). 
Among the different types of scenarios, exploratory scenarios, similar to the 
intuitive-logic model is the preferred tool for the analysing the thesis topic, owing to its 
systemic approach in examining drivers and ability to capture broad dimensions of 
changes (Mcdowall & Eames, 2006). While exploratory scenarios take past trends as 
their starting point (Berkhout & Hertin, 2002), there is a stronger focus on the drivers 
of change when building storylines which explore how different potential futures may 
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unfold without pre-determining a desirable end state (Mcdowall & Eames, 2006). While 
computer model-based scenarios (similar to PMT models) can be powerful tools for 
incorporating information from the field of science, engineering and economics, as well 
as for making cumulative projections, they generally focus on the techno-economic 
variables (Geels, McMeekin, & Pfluger, 2018; McDowall, 2016). In addition, model-
based scenarios tend to be built on assumptions which fail to fully capture the reality 
of the complexities in low-carbon transitions, undermining the relevance and 
usefulness of a scenario exercise in the real world (Geels et al., 2018; McDowall, 
2016). In particular, Geels et al. (2018) noted that the lack of actors and agencies in 
model-based scenarios, and that variables such as social perceptions and political 
feasibility are hardly factored in. Furthermore, the transition pathways arising from 
model-based scenarios are presented as smooth diffusion curves, where 
policymakers seem to play a role from outside the system, when in fact they are nested 
within the system and can be influenced by other actors (Geels et al., 2018). 
4.2 The Multi-level Perspective 
To understand how the prospects of blue and green hydrogen export in Norway 
could unfold in the different scenarios, the thesis adopts the transition pathways from 
the multi-level perspective (MLP). The MLP is a useful heuristic device for analysing 
and understanding how major shifts in socio-technical transitions can take place 
through the  interplay of developments at three levels: socio-technical landscape, 
socio-technical regime and niche-innovation (Geels, 2011; Geels et al., 2016; Geels 
& Schot, 2007; Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2010). In the context of this thesis, the socio-
technical landscape consists of slow-changing factors like increasing climate change 
awareness, the long-term changes such as the deep decarbonisation process of the 
EU’s economy through the uptake of hydrogen technology, as well as sudden external 
changes like gas price shocks. The socio-technical regime refers to the energy export 
regime which functions under a system of semi-coherent practices and rules that is 
mainly shaped by the key incumbent, Equinor, which was once described as a “state 
within a state” because of its excessive influence on the energy and economic policies 
in Norway (Moe, 2015, p. 195; Thurber & Istad, 2010, p. 27). The radical niche-
innovations refers to the radical innovations which are being developed in “protected 
spaces” and are the source for systemic change (Geels, 2002, p. 1262, 2011; Grin et 
al., 2010). While the technologies required for large-scale hydrogen production are 
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widely considered as market mature in Norway, the key infrastructure required for 
hydrogen export like large-scale storage and transport, is currently non-existent in 
Norway. Therefore, hydrogen is considered as a niche-innovation in this framework of 
analysis. 
 
Figure 2: Multi-level perspective on transitions. Source: (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 401) 
Figure 2 is an illustration of the dynamics of the interactions between the three 
levels of the MLP which suggests that transitions take place when there is alignment 
in the “interacting processes within and between the incumbent regime, radical niche-
innovations and the sociotechnical landscape” (Geels, 2018, p. 225). While regime 
actors have limited control or no control over the landscape factors in the short run, 
changes in the landscape factors can create pressures strong enough to cause 
regimes to destabilise and open up window of opportunity for niche-innovations to 
break through the regime, depending on the timing and the nature of the interactions 
between the different levels (Geels, 2011, 2018; Geels et al., 2016; Geels & Schot, 
2007). The downward arrows from the landscape and regime level towards the niche-
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innovation level represent their respective influences on the perceptions of niche 
actors and size of support networks (Geels & Schot, 2007). 
Under the MLP, four main types of transition pathways (substitution, 
transformation, reconfiguration, or de-alignment and re-alignment) could arise from 
the different ways the regime interacts with the landscape and niche based on the 
readiness of the niche-technology at the time of the opening of the window of 
opportunity and the nature of the relationship that the technology share with the 
existing regime, whether it is competitive or symbiotic  (Geels et al., 2016; Geels & 
Schot, 2007). In the case of Norway, blue hydrogen is considered as a symbiotic 
niche-innovation because its production is dependent on the regime’s resources, both 
natural gas and CCS technology. Green hydrogen, on the other hand, would be 
considered as a competitive niche-innovation because it is developed primarily by 
actors outside of the regime, such as Green H2 Norway (a newly established joint-
venture for large-scale electrolysis-based production of hydrogen) and possibly Yara 
(largest ammonia producer), if the transport of hydrogen is transported in the form of 
ammonia. The next four sub-sections will briefly describe each of these pathways and 
how they are relevant to the thesis. 
4.2.1. Substitution pathway 
The substitution pathway is likely to take place if niche-innovations have 
already reached sufficient maturity to compete with regime technologies when the 
window of opportunity opens, and if the development of the niche technology had 
taken place outside of the regime, separately by either new entrants who struggle 
against the established incumbent firms, or outsiders such as activists, social 
movements actors, citizens or incumbents from other sectors. This pathway has great 
relevance for green hydrogen since the development of its technology is being 
undertaken by incumbents from other sectors in Norway, namely NEL and Yara. 
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Figure 3: Substitution pathway of the MLP. Source: (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 410) 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the opening of the window of opportunity is triggered 
by a “specific shock”, “avalanche change” or “disruptive change” in the landscape 
exerting pressure on the regime and causing major regime tensions (Geels et al., 2016; 
Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 410). A “specific shock” is defined as a change in the 
environment that occur rarely and may dissipate after a while, but has the capacity to 
cause quick and significant changes in a few environmental dimensions, whereas an 
“avalanche change” differs from a “specific shock” in that the changes extends to 
multiple environmental dimensions and are likely to remain permanent. A “disruptive 
change” is an infrequent change that may appear small and moderate initially but 
gradually intensifies to have a high impact on one environmental dimension. (Geels & 
Schot, 2007, p. 404). An example is climate change, which was initially viewed as non-
threatening, to today being an important consideration in Norway’s politics. 
As a result of the opening window of opportunity, green hydrogen has the 
opportunity to emerge into the mainstream regime to compete with blue hydrogen and 
achieve further price and performance improvements. This eventually leads to the 
technological substitution of blue hydrogen with green hydrogen, while blue hydrogen 
actors (E.g. Equinor) could end up being overthrown by green hydrogen actors (E.g. 
Green H2 Norway) in this pathway.  
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4.2.2 Transformation pathway 
In the transformation pathway, the niche-innovation is not fully developed at the 
time when moderate changes in the landscape (or “disruptive changes”) exert 
pressure on the regime, resulting in only incremental adjustments of the regime rules 
by incumbent actors (Geels & Schot, 2007). The speed and degree at which the 
reorientation of the regime takes place depend on how strong the socio-political 
pressures are and how the market opportunities are perceived (Geels et al., 2016). 
The dynamics of the transformation pathway is illustrated in Figure 4. This scenario 
could apply to blue hydrogen, which effectively is an add-on to the existing technology 
for exporting natural gas that emits less GHG by the fossil fuel regime.  
 
Figure 4: Transformation pathway of the MLP. Source: Geels & Schot (2007, p. 407) 
It can be argued that the reorientation of the oil and gas regime in Norway has 
already began when Equinor changed its company name from Statoil in 2018, in 
recognition of the global energy transition and the developments in its business 
portfolio as a broad energy company (Equinor ASA, 2019a). In parallel to its efforts to 
explore for more oil and gas in the NCS, Equinor has also invested heavily (but to 
lesser extent compared to petroleum technology) in developing low-carbon 
technologies like CCS and offshore wind projects, both of which can be linked to 
hydrogen production. Considering the close connection between blue hydrogen and 
natural gas, blue hydrogen represents a partial reorientation of the regime where both 
new and old technologies co-exist, and institutional changes are limited. On the other 
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hand, a full orientation is said to take place when the old technology (blue hydrogen 
production) is replaced by the new technology (green hydrogen production powered 
by offshore wind), in which case, one would expect substantial institutional changes 
(Geels & Schot, 2007). 
4.2.3 Reconfiguration pathway 
The reconfiguration pathway involves new alliances that are formed between 
symbiotic niche-innovations and the existing regime (Geels et al., 2016). The initial 
phase is similar to the transformation pathway whereby symbiotic niche-innovations 
are adopted as add-on or component replacement to existing technologies to solve 
minor problems such as performance improvements while the basic architecture of 
the regime remains relatively intact (Geels et al., 2016; Geels & Schot, 2007). However, 
as the new alliances encounter new problems or identify new opportunities due to 
knock-on effects and innovation cascades, more substantial changes are introduced 
to the system components and relations, resulting in major reconfigurations of the 
regime’s basic architecture as can be observed in Figure 5 (Geels et al., 2016; Geels 
& Schot, 2007). 
 
Figure 5: Reconfiguration pathway of the MLP. Source: Geels & Schot (2007) 
This pathway may be more relevant if the object of analysis is studying the 
entire energy system comprising of the production, distribution and consumption value 
chain up to the end-use applications. As the focus of the supply chain in this thesis 
ends at the distribution to the wholesale customers and does not include the 
distribution to the end-users, the reconfiguration pathway is deemed to be not relevant. 
 19 
4.2.4 De-alignment and Re-alignment pathway 
This pathway is likely to take place if the energy export regime collapses due 
to a combination of major internal problems such as failure to find new gas fields, and 
large sudden external shocks (or “avalanche change”) such as plummeting natural 
gas prices and changes in EU energy import strategy. The collapse results in a regime 
vacuum where there is an extended period of uncertainty and co-existence of multiple 
niche-innovations, that is the alternative energy export technologies, due to their 
nascent state of technology. 
 
Figure 6: De-alignment and re-alignment pathway of the MLP. Source: Geels & Schot (2007) 
The potential alternatives for energy export in Norway consist mainly of large-
scale green hydrogen export and surplus electricity export from onshore and offshore 
wind. Struggles and tensions are expected to intensify between multiple groups and 
constituencies as they compete with each other for attention and resources, as well 
as to establish new institutions to replace the old ones (Geels et al., 2016; Geels & 
Schot, 2007). As shown in Figure 6 illustrates, the regime will re-align itself and 
become re-established as a new regime when one niche-innovation gains momentum 
and becomes prevalent (Geels et al., 2016; Geels & Schot, 2007).  
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5.0 Research design and methodology 
This section is comprised of three parts. The first part describes and explains 
the research strategy used in this thesis, while the second part details the process of 
the main methodology used in this thesis, an in-depth literature review. Limitations of 
the thesis are highlighted in the third part. 
5.1 Research strategy 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the potential futures of hydrogen in 
Norway as an energy export by adopting the critical social science approach. Adopting 
this methodology allows one to gain a better understanding of the role hydrogen can 
play in the Norwegian energy export market and seeks to unravel the conditions that 
govern the existing basic structure of the regime by exposing the social and political 
relations, as well as the unacknowledged constraints (Neuman, 2014). In so doing, 
one hopes to enlighten and help key actors in the energy market of Norway make 
more informed policy changes to enable a move towards a low-carbon energy 
transition. 
Given the uncertainties surrounding the developments of hydrogen technology 
for export purposes, this thesis adopts an abductive research approach as a way to 
advance learning through the development of alternative possible scenarios (Neuman, 
2014). The storyline of each scenario is built upon two frameworks: exploratory 
scenarios and the PESTEL analysis. The exploratory scenarios set the framework in 
which the prospects of blue and green hydrogen are explored, while the PESTEL 
analysis provide an overview of the driving forces that could underpin the 
developments of the future environment in which the energy export regime in Norway 
operates. The PESTEL analysis consists of an in-depth literature review to categorize  
the factors into six dimensions: political (P), economics (E), social parameters (S), 
technology (T), the natural environment (E) and legal structures (L) (Walsh, 2005; 
Wright, Cairns, O’Brien, & Goodwin, 2019). With the factors identified, this thesis then 
takes the MLP as a starting point to deductively fit the information gathered in the 
PESTEL framework within each scenario to construct the storylines at the three levels: 
niche, regime and landscape, and discusses the interplay of the various factors which 
could impact the prospects of a hydrogen economy for Norway. 
Exploratory scenario approach has been chosen as analytical tool is used in 
this thesis to create a two-dimensional matrix as it allows for a systematic analysis of 
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the underlying drivers of change upon which the storylines of the possible futures is 
built. The matrix is created by combining the two top uncertainties in the energy 
landscape of Norway, identified as EU’s 2050 climate change commitment to become 
carbon neutral and the availability of Norway’s natural gas reserves, which is 
contingent on the discovery and exploitation of new hydrocarbon fields by 2023 (Hall, 
2018). A two-dimensional matrix is thus derived in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Four Norwegian contextual futures scenarios 
The choice of these two key uncertainties stems from the observation of a lack 
of a balanced consideration of these plausible futures and their impacts on Norway 
from the government and the oil and gas industry. Although the EU is said to be not 
on track to reaching their 2020 climate goals, there is still time for the EU to catch up 
and reach its 2050 climate goals (European Environment Agency, 2019). Given that 
the non-linear nature of transition, it would be economically too risky for Norway to 
dismiss EU’s carbon targets for 2050 as overly ambitious and remain complacent in 
their efforts to reduce their carbon footprint. The uncertainty on “EU’s climate change 
commitment” is represented by the vertical y-axis, where a low commitment assumes 
a gradual transition in the EU energy system where fossil fuel is expected to still play 
a dominant role in 2050. On the other end of the spectrum, a high commitment 
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assumes a rapid energy transition in the EU due to a strong commitment to become 
carbon neutral by 2050. 
The uncertainty over the future of the availability of Norway’s natural gas 
reserves to support the energy export market arises from the somewhat excessive 
optimism for the undiscovered resources to start contributing to future production of 
fossil fuel in the NCS as early as 2025 onwards (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2018c). By 2030, 24.1 million standard cubic meters of natural gas oil equivalent (Sm3 
o.e.) of undiscovered resources is expected to account for 13% of production 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018a). This projection seems to disregard the fact 
that the average lead time between 2014 and 2018 for developing new fields is 16 
years (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c, 2019f). To complicate things further, 
66% of the undiscovered natural gas lies in the Barents Sea, where the gas transport 
infrastructure is limited to the liquefaction plant in Melkøya whose capacity is expected 
to be fully utilized by the early 2040s (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c). 
Representing this uncertainty is the horizontal x-axis, where the low end of the scale 
assumes that a decreasing production of natural gas due to the lack of new 
commercially exploitable fields, whereas the high end assumes that new gas 
resources are discovered in time to prolong the future of fossil fuel export well into 
2050 for Norway. 
The four scenarios in the quadrants in Figure 7 will be described more in detail 
in the discussion section (Section 6), but may be briefly summarized as follows: 
• Global synergies: EU is strongly committed to reach its climate change goals by 
2050 and does so by implementing coordinated policies to facilitate a rapid and 
smooth phase-out of fossil fuel in its energy system. Additionally, the EU actively 
strives to foster greater international cooperation both within the EU and with 
Norway, who is forced to re-orientate its economy due to the risk posed by its fast-
depleting natural gas reserves. 
• Increased focus on CCS: Similar to the “Global synergies” scenario, EU is strongly 
committed to achieve its 2050 climate change goals which entails phasing out fossil 
fuel. However, a discovery of a big natural oil and gas field in the NCS leads to an 
abundant reserve of natural gas. In order for the EU to accept natural gas exports 
from Norway, the Norwegian government and petroleum industry intensify efforts to 
make CCS commercially available. 
 23 
• Inevitable transition: The pace of energy transition in the EU remains sluggish 
relative to the pace needed to the transition to a carbon-neutral society by 2050. 
While demand for natural gas remains high in the EU at the end of 2030, the 
anticipation of Norway running out of natural gas reserves forces EU to turn to other 
suppliers, causing the regime in Norway to destabilize. While Norway takes the lead 
to push for the decarbonization of EU’s energy system in order to secure new 
market opportunities for its niche-innovations, tensions and struggles arise among 
niche-innovations in Norway as they compete for resources to try and fill in the void. 
• Slow transition: With a low climate change commitment, EU is likely to miss its 2030 
climate targets and as a result, 2050 climate goals are not likely to be achieved. 
With the new discovery of oil and gas fields in the NCS, Norway intensifies 
exploration activities in the Barents Sea in order to extract its remaining uncovered 
gas resources in the shortest time possible to avoid having assets “stranded” in the 
ground. Research in alternative niche-innovations is still expected to continue to 
prepare for the eventuality of fully depleted gas resources post-2050. 
5.2 Literature review 
The literature review used in the work of this thesis can be categorized into 
three main types: content review, historical review and integrative review. A content 
review is conducted in order to link hydrogen to the broader framework of energy 
transitions in Norway, while a historical review is used to trace back the developments 
of hydrogen and other niche-innovation technologies in Norway to unravel the political 
and social relations in the energy sector (Neuman, 2014). An integrative review is 
done in order to present and summarize the current state of knowledge on hydrogen 
technology (Neuman, 2014). 
For the content review, the literature reviewed consisted of articles concerning 
1) Norwegian fossil fuel 2) hydrogen technology 3) EU climate change commitments. 
Literature related to the Norwegian fossil fuel and its importance to Norway were 
based on data and reports found on government websites, particularly the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD), Government.no, Energy Facts Norway and Statistics 
Norway. To gain a basic understanding of state of play and potential role that hydrogen 
and fuel cell technology can play in a low-carbon energy future, the IEA (2015) 
technology roadmap report for hydrogen and fuel cells served as a good starting point. 
The data was later revised accordingly upon the publication of IEA (2019c) report with 
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the latest updates on the current state of technology. Literature pertaining to EU’s 
climate change commitments were mainly based on information sourced from the 
European Commission and EU websites. 
The peer-review scientific journal articles used to conduct a historical review of 
hydrogen developments in Norway, was sourced using an advanced search 
combining the keywords “hydrogen” and “Norway” of the library database of the 
University of Stavanger. This search yielded 26,652 results, which included hydrogen 
used in different context. To yield more relevant results, a filter was added to include 
only articles published in the International Journal of Hydrogen Energy which yielded 
a more manageable result of 647 articles. It is worth mentioning that the paper by 
Godoe & Nygaard (2006) on the historical developments of hydrogen technology in 
Norway was key in identifying the key players in this sector and their connections with 
each other, which eventually led me to other valuable sources of scientific literature. 
A historical review of the development of other niche-innovations in Norway 
was also done using mainly literature that had been part of the curriculum of my current 
2-year Master program. In particular, the book chapter by Moe (2015) and scientific 
papers by Gullberg (2013) and Langhelle, Kern, & Meadowcroft (2017) were found to 
provide a clear understanding of Norway’s politics in the energy sector. 
To summarize the state of play for the various new technologies (e.g. 
electrolysers, CCS, wind turbines, etc), an integrative review was done on literature 
from a variety of sources, including peer-review scientific papers, hydrogen-related 
reports from organizations such as Hydrogen Council, Hydrogen Europe, Norwegian 
Hydrogen Forum, reports from research institutes such as FCH JU and SINTEF, as 
well as reports from energy consultancy agencies like DNV GL. 
5.3 Limitations of scope 
The chosen timeframe for the analysis is limited to the year 2050, when the 
demand for hydrogen is expected to be developed in the EU as it transitions to a 
carbon-neutral economy. 
Due to the lack of proficiency in the Norwegian language, most of the literature 
reviewed are in English. A handful of reports which contained critical information for 
the analysis, were only available in Norwegian, such as the DNV GL report on the 
production and uses of hydrogen in Norway (Aarnes et al., 2019), the NVE reports on 
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long-term power production market analysis in the Nordics (Bartnes, Amundsen, & 
Holm, 2018; Gogia et al., 2019; Veie et al., 2019). For these reports, Google 
Translation tool was used to translate the content. 
While the scenario framework used was inspired by the ‘Shell approach’ to 
scenarios, which is a group-process-based approach to capture the consensus of 
opinions from a large group of experts through multiple sessions, the time and 
resource constraints does not allow for this methodology to be adopted for this thesis. 
As such, the thesis adapted the scenario framework by fitting in the MLP pathways, 
as described in in Section 4.2. 
This thesis is limited to the study of prospects of the blue and green hydrogen 
production for export purposes for Norway, based on a value chain that ends at the 
point of export. Due to the extensive research required, considerations of the 
geographical distribution of the energy sources in Norway, the destination points for 




6.0 A PESTEL analysis of hydrogen as an energy export in Norway 
To provide an overview of the key factors affecting the energy regime, the 
broader energy landscape and the development of hydrogen in Norway, a PESTEL 
analysis is employed. It is a popular technique used in scenario development to list 
the driving forces related to the political, economic, social, technological, 
environmental and legal factors influencing the environment in which the regime 
operates (Walsh, 2005). Some of these factors will be then used to construct scenarios 
for each of four themes mentioned in Section 3.3, that is reconfiguration, de-alignment 
and re-alignment, substitution and transformation. 
6.1 Political factors (P) 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) – Strong governmental support for CCS in 
Norway: Among energy-related technologies in Norway, CCS has been afforded 
generous amount of government support (close to 1 billion EUR invested between 
2007 and 2012) despite not adhering to the usual policy criteria of cost-effectiveness 
(Moe, 2012, 2015; Normann, 2017). This is due to CCS being viewed as a solution to 
a political conflict that arose in 2000 over the building of two natural gas-fired power 
plants (Kårstø and Mongstad) when Norway became a net electricity importer for a 
number of years between mid-1990s and mid-2000s due to falling investments in new 
generation of electricity and relatively high energy demand growth (Aune, Bye, & 
Johnsen, 2000; Energy Facts Norway, 2017, 2019b). The conflict was eventually 
resolved with a compromise where CCS must be applied for the building of the gas-
fired power plants to be approved whereas the government would subsidise majority 
of the research cost for CCS (Normann, 2017). As such, CCS functioned as a political 
glue that unites various governmental parties and makes governmental coalitions 
possible (Langhelle et al., 2017). However, despite the fact CCS did not materialize in 
both plants due to high costs, the gas-fired power plants had to close down due to low 
electricity prices and high natural gas prices (Langhelle et al., 2017; Normann, 2017; 
Reuters, 2017). Nevertheless, CCS continue to enjoy strong government support as 
the focus turned to industrial applications as a way to demonstrate the viability of CCS 
as a mitigation measure for climate change to a global audience (Langhelle et al., 
2017; Roettereng, 2016). The continued interests in CCS could also be linked back to 
the concerns about the future value of natural gas exports in anticipation of more 
ambitious international climate policies (Normann, 2017). 
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Enabler (blue hydrogen) / Barrier (green hydrogen) – A petro-industrial 
complex in Norway: Norway politics is said to be dominated by the petro-industrial 
complex, in which policymakers create policies that prioritizes the economic interests 
of the petroleum industry over climate change concerns  (Moe, 2015). The lack of cost 
control by the government on Equinor (former Statoil), who was responsible for 
running the original full-scale CCS demonstration project in the Technology Centre 
Mongstad (TCM) demonstrates the tight relationship between the policymakers and 
Equinor (Moe, 2015). Despite the previous setbacks with CCS projects, including the 
termination of the original full-scale CCS project in 2013, the Norwegian long-term 
energy strategy is likely to include CCS as it fits the interests of the oil and gas sector 
to continue the exploitation of fossil fuel reserves in a carbon-constrained world and 
to prevent structural changes that could have benefited the RE sector (Meadowcroft 
& Langhelle, 2009; Moe, 2015). While this may boost the development of blue 
hydrogen production, it may divert resources away from the needed investment for RE 
projects, that is critical to the development of green hydrogen production in Norway. 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Rising carbon prices and tax in the 
EU: As of 1st Jan 2018, Norway’s full carbon tax rate was increased to 500 NOK/tCO2e 
(around 51 EUR3/tCO2e) (Energifakta Norge, 2017). Carbon taxes in Norway are 
perceived to be more costly than investing in CCS technology, and such acted a key 
driver for the implementation of CCS in Equinor’s Sleipner facility in the North Sea in 
1996 and the original Technology Centre Mongstad (TCM) project dedicated to CCS 
research (Global CCS Institute, 2018; Moe, 2015). In contrast, carbon prices in the EU 
ETS had been significantly low at below 10 USD/tCO2e (9 EUR4/tCO2e) between 2012 
and 2018 due to surplus allowances cumulated since the 2009 global financial crisis 
and recession (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2018; World Bank Group, 2019). To calibrate 
the system, the EU introduced the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) mechanism in 
January 2019 and other reforms, which drove carbon prices up by more than triple to 
around 32 USD/tCO2e (29 EUR5/tCO2e) based on nominal prices as of 1st Nov 2019 
(World Bank Group, 2019). According to the impact modelling conducted by carbon 
                                                        
3 Based on average exchange rates for the period 1st Jan 2019 to 28th Dec 2019: 1 EUR = 9.8511 NOK (European 
Central Bank, 2019) 
4 Based on average exchange rates for the period 1st Jan 2019 to 28th Dec 2019: 1 USD = 0.8934 EUR (European 
Central Bank, 2019) 
5 Based on average exchange rates for the period 1st Jan 2019 to 28th Dec 2019: 1 USD = 0.8934 EUR (European 
Central Bank, 2019) 
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market analyst firm ICIS, the implementation of phase 4 of the EU ETS in the period 
2021 to 2030 will likely see carbon prices peak at 35 EUR/tCO2e in 2023-2024 before 
declining to around 20 EUR/tCO2e by 2030 (De Clara & Mayr, 2018). However, should 
the EU decide to align its current policies with the Paris Agreement through the 
adoption of the newly unveiled European Green Deal, the EU’s roadmap to becoming 
climate neutral by 2050 (European Commission, 2019), carbon prices could be 
expected to reach as high as 55 EUR/tCO2e by 2030 (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2018). 
For CCS to be economical feasible, van Cappellen et al. (2018) estimates that carbon 
prices needs to be at least 50 EUR/tCO2e, accompanied by a supportive policy 
environment.  
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Deep decarbonisation of the EU by 
2050: As part of its climate goal to be become a carbon-neutral economy by 2050, the 
EU would need to decarbonize its transport, building and industry sector, driving a 
strong demand for hydrogen (FCH JU, 2019). If the full program of the European 
Green Deal is adopted by the EU, there is a higher chance for the 2050 climate goal 
to be achieved (European Commission, 2019). In its ambitious scenario for the 
deployment of  hydrogen in the EU to achieve the two-degree target under the Paris 
Agreement, about 2,250 terawatt hours (TWh) of hydrogen will be needed to fulfil 24% 
of the total forecasted energy demand in 2050 (FCH JU, 2019). In spite of plans of 
domestic production of hydrogen in the EU, high volume production will be challenging 
due to competing use for the electricity generated from its RE resources (Wietschel & 
Hasenauer, 2007). This presents an opportunity for Norway to meet part of that 
demand through export. 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – Diminishing political support for further 
offshore exploration in Norway: In July 2019, the largest political party as well as 
the biggest worker union in Norway, the Labour party, voted against the impact 
assessment of petroleum activity in the Lofoten islands, which is a pre-requisite for 
opening new areas for oil exploration (Holter, 2019a; Schober, 2019). Despite 
assurances from the leader of the Labour party of his continuous support for the oil 
and gas industry, the move nevertheless creates uncertainties about the future 
developments of policies governing oil exploration in the Arctic, which raises the 
stakes for further investments in the region (Schober, 2019). This could potentially 
affect the amount of natural gas resources available for blue hydrogen production. 
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6.2 Economic factors (E) 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – A growing global demand for 
hydrogen in EU: Demand for hydrogen in the EU is projected to grow as EU 
strategizes towards a carbon-neutral economy through deep decarbonisation of its 
various sectors with hydrogen as a low-carbon energy carrier. Although there have 
been two major waves of fervour for hydrogen previously, there is reason to believe 
that the current interests in hydrogen is gaining some traction at a much bigger scale 
due to the falling costs of other low-carbon technologies such as batteries and RE, as 
well as the expansion of its applications beyond the transport sector to hard-to-
decarbonized sectors such as the industry, building and power generation sectors 
(IEA, 2019c). According to the 2019 Europe Hydrogen Roadmap, the hydrogen 
demand under the business-as-usual scenario in 2050 amounts to 780 TWh (or 20 
MT H2) and 2 251 TWh (or 57 MT H2) (FCH JU, 2019). 
Table 1: Hydrogen demand in the EU in 2050 (MT)  
 
Note: Conversion based on 1 TWh = 7/278 MT (Hydrogen Council, 2017). Source: FCH JU (2019). 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Limited electricity surplus in the EU 
due to low curtailment rates of VRE: Given the relatively high electricity prices in 
the EU compared to Norway, it would be more cost-effective to produce green 
hydrogen using surplus RE in the EU which is otherwise curtailed. However, looking 
at the low curtailment rates of Variable RE (VRE) projected in IRENA (2018c) for 2030 
at the EU level of 0.8% (6.0 TWh based on VRE power generation of 753 TWh) under 
the REmap Case (decarbonization scenario) and 0.6% (6.7 TWh based on VRE power 
generation of 1 122 TWh) under the Reference Case (business as usual) scenarios, it 
is unlikely that the volume of hydrogen production based on only surplus electricity 
from RE sources would be sufficient to meet the demand  (IFPEN & SINTEF, 2019). 
Therefore, this presents an opportunity for Norway to tap into the hydrogen export 
market to meet the demand of the EU, provided that the total cost, including the cost 
Sector 2015 Business as usual 2050 Ambitious  2050
Industy Feedstock 8 10 16
Industry Energy 1 6
Buildings 5 15
Transportation 2 17
Power generation 1 3
Total hydrogen demand 8 20 57
Hydrogen Demand in the EU in 2050 (MT)
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of converting hydrogen into a transportable form (compressed gas, ammonia, LOHC 
or LH2) and the cost of transport, is relatively cheaper than domestic hydrogen 
production in the EU. 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) – Access to substantial natural gas resource: 
About 77% of EU’s gas demand in 2018 is met through natural gas imports, of which 
25% is supplied by Norway (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019d). As the world’s 
third largest natural gas exporter (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019d), Norway 
has access to cheap natural gas to produce blue hydrogen more cost-effectively than 
its neighbours in the EU, provided that the final price of hydrogen including the 
transportation is lower than exporting natural gas as feedstock for hydrogen 
production at or near the site of use (currently deemed to be the more efficient pathway) 
(Wietschel & Hasenauer, 2007). Based on the 2017 natural gas prices assumed in the 
IEA G20 Hydrogen report for the EU of 0.277 USD6/Sm3, the average blue hydrogen 
production cost in Europe using SMR and CCS technology is estimated to be around 
2.30 USD/kgH2 (IEA, 2019c). Compared to Norway, this is almost double that of the 
cost estimated at around 1.21 to 1.82 USD/kgH27 (10 to 15 NOK/kgH2) based on 
natural gas price prices of 0.21-0.27 USD8/Sm3 (Aarnes et al., 2019). 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) – Lower risk of stranded assets: From the 
Norwegian perspective, blue hydrogen could minimize the risk of stranded assets in 
the form of hydrocarbons reserves being left underground, which is expected to last 
for another 50 years of production (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019e). In 
addition, the current existing gas infrastructure can be adapted to transport both blue 
and green hydrogen to Europe. Furthermore, blue hydrogen could be used as a 
justification for further exploration for natural gas in the Barents Sea. However, from 
an economic perspective, the investment is CCS and steam-reforming facilities in 
Norway could potentially create a technological lock-in of the investments in blue 
hydrogen production which may delay the development of green hydrogen production, 
                                                        
6 IEA (2019a) assumptions annex: USD 7.30/MMBtu converted at 1 Sm3 = 0.037913 MMBtu at 2017 exchange 
rates (Norwegianpetroleum.no, n.d.) 
7 Based on average 2017 exchange rates to compare with IEA report data for EU natural gas prices: 1 USD = 
8.263 NOK (Norges Bank, 2019) 
8 Based on average 2017 exchange rates to compare with IEA report data for EU natural gas prices: 1 USD = 
8.263 NOK (Norges Bank, 2019) 
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unless strong governmental policies are put in place to ensure parallel development 
of both technologies. 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Low electricity prices: Compared to the rest of 
Europe, Norway has one of the cheapest and cleanest electricity, attributed to the 
massive expansion of hydropower plants in the 1990s. On average, Norway electricity 
prices for non-household consumers have been lower than EU28 by 15% to 38% in 
the period 2013-2017 (Eurostat, 2019). This trend is expected to continue up to 2040 
despite the fact that NVE expects an increase in the average electricity prices from 
40.6 EUR/MWh in 2022 to 43.6 EUR/MWh in 2040 (see Table 4) (Gogia et al., 2019). 
The increase in prices between 2022 and 2025, and between 2030 and 2040 is due 
to higher domestic electricity consumption as a result of increased electrification in 
Norway, as well as electricity price increases in countries whose electricity grids are 
interconnected with Norway’s (Gogia et al., 2019). The key reasons for the increase 
in electricity prices in Europe include electricity consumption growth, higher carbon 
prices, the phase out of coal power plants with gas power plants, increasing natural 
gas prices, and the decommissioning of old Swedish and Finnish nuclear power plants 
towards 2040 (Gogia et al., 2019). The fall in electricity prices between 2025 and 2030 
are mainly due to the expected electricity surplus from large-scale wind power 
development in Sweden and the decommissioning of the carbon floor in UK, which is 
assumed to take place when coal power is fully phased out in 2025 (Gogia et al., 2019). 
Lower electricity prices implies that green hydrogen can be produced more cost-
competitively in Norway than if it was produced domestically in the EU (Aarnes et al., 
2019). Based on an electricity price of 46 USD9/MWh (380 NOK/MWh) excluding taxes, 
Aarnes et al. (2019) estimated the cost of green hydrogen production via ALK in 
Norway in 2030 to be around 2.66 USD10/kg H2 (22 NOK/kg H2), which is about 1.5 to 





                                                        
9 Based on average 2017 exchange rates: 1 USD = 8.263 NOK (Norges Bank, 2019) 
10 Based on average 2017 exchange rates: 1 USD = 8.263 NOK (Norges Bank, 2019) 
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Table 2: Average electricity prices estimated by NVE for Baseline scenario 2022-2040 
 
Source: Gogia et al. (2019). All figures converted at 2017 average exchange rates of 1 USD = 8.263 
NOK (Norges Bank, 2019). Figures in green signify lower prices than the previous period and figures in 
red signify and increase in price compared to previous period. 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) / Enabler (green hydrogen) – Cutback on fossil 
fuel funding by EIB: In an attempt to align its strategy with the Paris Agreement 
targets, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s lending arm and the biggest 
public bank in the world, recently announced its decision to curtail funding for energy 
projects that emits more than 0.25 kg of CO2e per kWh produced, which would exclude 
traditional gas power plant projects, coal and oil projects (“European Investment Bank 
drops fossil fuel funding,” 2019; Watts, 2019). The new policy is expected to into effect 
at the end of 2021, sending a strong signal to markets and other lenders to start 
phasing out high carbon projects. In addition, this move would benefit renewable 
energy developments as more funding will become available (Watts, 2019). 
6.3 Social factors (S) 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) / Barrier (green hydrogen) – Heavy reliance on 
oil and gas export for social welfare: The energy export market in Norway is 
dominated by the oil and gas sector, which contributes to 17% of Norway’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) and about 6% to the labour market with 170 200 out of 2.8 
million jobs in 2017 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018b; Statistics Norway, 
2018b). Majority of profits from the activity are invested into Norway’s sovereign wealth 
fund, worth 1 trillion USD in 2019, the largest in the world. Understandably, there is 
strong resistance in Norway among its citizens to transition away from being an oil-
and-gas exporting economy. 
Enabler (Green hydrogen) / Barrier (Blue hydrogen) – Uncertainty over the 
future of oil and gas: The collapse of the oil prices in mid-2014 in the wake of shale 
Year Norway Germany UK Netherlands Denmark France
2022 48.4                 52.0                 61.7                 50.8                 50.8                 50.8                 
2025 52.0                 54.5                 64.1                 53.2                 54.5                 55.7                 
2030 44.8                 54.5                 56.9                 53.2                 49.6                 55.7                 
2040 52.0                 60.5                 59.3                 56.9                 55.7                 58.1                 
2022 +7% +28% +5% +5% +5%
2025 +5% +23% +2% +5% +7%
2030 +22% +27% +19% +11% +24%
2040 +16% +14% +9% +7% +12%
Difference vs. Norway (%)
Average electricity prices (﻿USD/MWh)
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oil revolution, which forced the oil companies in Norway to lay off an estimated 12,000 
employees in the industry between 2014 and 2016 and caused unemployment rate, 
to peak at 4.9% in mid-2016 made people realize how vulnerable the economy is to 
volatility in oil and gas prices (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018b; Statistics 
Norway, 2017). The decision by the central Norges Bank, which manages Norway’s 
sovereign wealth fund, to divest away from oil and gas companies in 2019 reinforces 
the perception that the low oil and gas prices are likely to remain permanent (Davies, 
2019). Moreover, the over-supply of natural gas imports from US, Qatar and Russia 
which caused market prices of natural gas to plunge recently, as well as the 
construction of Nord Stream 2, a new gas pipeline that connects Russia directly to 
Germany, alludes to the increasingly tough competition that Norway will face in the 
natural gas export market to the EU (Ambrose, 2019; BBC, 2019). 
Enabler (green hydrogen) / Barrier (blue hydrogen) – Rising climate 
change awareness among youths: In Norway, the gloomy outlook for the oil and 
gas sector coupled with increasing environmental and climate awareness are causing 
concerns among youths, as can be noted in the sharp decline in the number of 
applications for Norway’s leading programs in petroleum geosciences and engineering 
at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim, from 
420 in 2013 to only 33 in 2018 (Adomaitis, 2019a). Furthermore, seven out of nine 
youth party organizations representing the different political parties are in support for 
the restriction or complete phase-out of petroleum activities (Adomaitis, 2019a). This 
would undoubtedly reduce the pool of qualified employees available to replace the 
rapidly aging workforce of the petroleum industry, half of whom are expected to retire 
in the next decade (Adomaitis, 2019a). In addition, the participation of millions in the 
global climate strike movement started by Swedish youth climate activist, Greta 
Thunberg, have led to the declaration of climate emergency by leaders around the 
world including the European Parliament (Alter, Haynes, & Worland, 2019; The 
European Parliament, 2019). While the declaration is non-binding, it represents the 
first step for the acceleration of efforts to reduce GHG emissions, which could imply 
more pressure to keep fossil fuels in the ground and better prospects of green 
hydrogen. 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Concerns about electricity being an energy 
export: As Norway prepares for a transition towards a future with lower oil and gas 
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revenues, a window of opportunity opens up for the growth of RE for export in the form 
of electricity or hydrogen. In order to export electricity, Norway would need to connect 
its electricity grids with its neighbouring countries via high-voltage direct current 
(HVDC) cables, but known to enjoy one of the cheapest electricity prices in Western 
Europe, trade unions in Norway have voiced out concerns about an increase in 
electricity prices in Norway as the cost of building the new infrastructure are passed 
on to customers and as Norway succumbs to pressure to align its prices to match EU 
electricity prices (Mollestad, 2018; Tomasgard & Korpås, 2018). If the surplus 
electricity can be exported in the form of green hydrogen, Norwegian citizens may 
have less concerns about their electricity prices being affected by the EU market. 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – General public receptiveness 
towards hydrogen:  Based on a survey conducted two years after the first hydrogen 
refuelling station (HRS) was opened in 2006 in Stavanger, residents living near the 
HRS and further away in the region were generally receptive towards hydrogen 
vehicles and refuelling stations (Thesen & Langhelle, 2008). The HRS was part of the 
HyNor project, a government-supported joint-industry initiative that started in 2003 to 
explore the application of hydrogen in the transport sector for the first time in Norway, 
in response to the fears of peak oil between 2003 and 2008 when the speed of 
production of oil was lagging behind a strong additional demand for crude oil from Asia, 
particularly China (Baumeister & Kilian, 2016) and concern for climate change (IEA, 
2019c; Sataøen, 2008). The objective of the project was to build a hydrogen highway 
that consists of a 580 km-long hydrogen corridor between Oslo and Stavanger, as a 
way to demonstrate how a hydrogen energy infrastructure could be implemented in 
real life (Sataøen, 2008; Simonsen & Hansen, 2010; Thesen & Langhelle, 2008). The 
receptiveness towards hydrogen could be mean less barrier to the building of large-
scale hydrogen facilities in Norway. 
Barrier (green and blue hydrogen) – Concerns for the safety and reliability 
of hydrogen: Research showed that safety issues concerning hydrogen are 
comparable to that of natural gas and that while hydrogen is more flammable than 
natural gas, it dissipates quickly (IEA, 2019c; Staffell et al., 2017; van Cappellen et al., 
2018). Nevertheless, four hydrogen accidents had been reported worldwide in 2019 
alone, of which two in South Korea, one in the USA and one in Norway (Hernández & 
Cassidy, 2019; Jin & Chung, 2019; NEL ASA, 2019b). While these accidents raise 
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questions about the safety and reliability of hydrogen, it is interesting to note the 
difference in the focus of the concerns between South Korea and that of Europe11 and 
the USA. Perhaps due to the casualties involved in both accidents and the relatively 
new experience in handling hydrogen, the public in South Korea was concerned about 
the safety in handling of hydrogen, whereas in Europe and the USA, this is less of an 
issue due to a longer history of experience in hydrogen production, hence the public 
were more concerned about the disruption of hydrogen supply particularly for 
hydrogen vehicle owners who have not been able to refuel their vehicles after the 
explosions. The lack of confidence in the reliability in supply may dampen the domestic 
demand for hydrogen in Norway, which could negatively impact the attractiveness of 
the investment in hydrogen infrastructure necessary for large-scale production and 
export. 
6.4 Technological factors (T) 
In this section, we will analyse the status and future developments of the key 
technological factors related to the hydrogen infrastructure which can impact the 
prospects of the export of blue and green hydrogen in Norway. These factors are 
broken down based on the four main parts of the infrastructure: energy sources, 
production, storage and transport. 
6.4.1 Energy input sources 
One of the key factors that will impact the prospects of blue hydrogen 
production is the capacity to find and extract more natural gas from the undiscovered 
reserves of hydrocarbon, particularly in the Barents Sea. The cost of exploration is 
also an important factor to consider as it impacts the profitability of natural gas and the 
cost of blue hydrogen production. 
The prospects of green hydrogen production for export depends highly on 
Norway’s capacity to generate electricity from RE sources to meet green hydrogen 
demand, after accounting for the domestic consumption of electricity. As at the end of 
2018, the total electricity generated in Norway amounted to 147 TWh, of which 140 
TWh was produced from hydropower plants and 4 TWh from onshore wind power. 
(Statistics Norway, 2019). Gross consumption of electricity in Norway stood at 137 
                                                        
11 Following the explosion in Norway, a total of 11 HRS supplied by NEL have been temporarily closed across 
Europe in Norway (3), Denmark and Germany (4) pending investigations (Hampel, 2019; Lorentzen, 2019). 
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TWh, which led to a surplus electricity of 10 TWh (Aarnes et al., 2019; Statistics 
Norway, 2019). 
Table 4 shows NVE’s latest estimates of the electricity generation in Norway in 
2030 and 2040 according to the Baseline scenario. It assumes that hydropower is 
expected to generate more electricity due to increased precipitation from rainfall and 
glacier melting, and that wind power from onshore turbines is expected to peak by 
2030 after the building of all the currently approved projects and technical 
improvements from reinvestments in wind turbines that have reached their technical 
life, but no new projects are expected to be built after due to public protests (Bartnes 
et al., 2018; Veie et al., 2019). Offshore wind power is expected to pick up from 2040 
onwards with around 4 TWh (Bartnes et al., 2018; Veie et al., 2019). 2050 electricity 
balance in Norway is built based on the assumption that the total electricity generated 
by hydropower, thermal power and solar power will remain the same as 2040, while 
offshore wind is forecasted by Skar et al. (2018) to increase to 65 TWh in 2050. The 
domestic electricity demand is expected to increase steadily from 137 TWh to 159 
TWh in 2040 according to Veie et al. (2019) and the same percentage increase 
between 2040 and 2030 is assumed for 2050, driven mainly by industrial growth and 
electrification of the transport sector (Aarnes et al., 2019; Bartnes et al., 2018). 
Therefore, by 2050, a surplus electricity of 80 TWh is available for green hydrogen 
production. 
Table 3: Electricity balance in Norway 2018 – 2050 
 
Figures for 2018: Statistics Norway (2019b); Figures for 2030 & 2040: Veie et al. (2019) and Gogia et 
al. (2019); Figures for 2050: Adapted from Skar, Jaehnert, Tomasgard, Midthun, & Fodstad (2018). 
Note: Thermal power includes energy sources such as waste, surplus heat and fossil fuel (Energy Facts 
Norway, 2019b). 
6.4.1.1 Natural gas 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) – Decreasing average cost per development well: 
Following the downturn in the petroleum sector in Norway in 2013, the industry had a 
2018 2030 2040 2050
Total Electricity production (TWh) 147                            174 184                    245                       
Hydropower 140                           147 151                   151                      
Onshore wind power 4                                 22 22 22
Offshore wind power -                            3 4 65
Thermal power 3                                 1 1 1
Solar power 2 7 7
Gross Consumption of Electricity (TWh) 137                            153 159 165                       
Surplus electricity (TWh) 10                               21                            25                       80                          
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strong focus on cost controlling and efficiency improvements, which led to a more than 
40% drop in the average operating cost per well in 2017 compared to 2013 (Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate, 2019f). However, since the Barents Sea remain mostly 
unexplored, the lower cost pertains to the more accessible fields in the North Sea and 
the Norwegian Sea. Nonetheless, the lower cost of operation could translate to lower 
cost of production of blue hydrogen, boosting its prospects in the medium term 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – Lack of infrastructure in the Barents Sea: The 
Barents Sea is estimated to hold about 66% of the total unproven gas resources in the 
NCS as at end of 2017, where there is a lack of infrastructure and gas transport 
capacity (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c). The current gas transport 
capacity is dependent on the liquefaction plant in Melkøya, which is expected to reach 
full capacity by early 2040s (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c). It would be 
challenging to explore for more gas without the necessary infrastructure and additional 
gas transport capacity, yet at the same time, it is questionable if there would be enough 
volume of gas resources to justify a new infrastructure (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2018c). 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – High geological risk in the Barents Sea: Despite 
the potential of finding larger finds in the less-explored Barents Sea, the success rate 
for finding a commercially viable field is much lower. Further, the harsher weather 
conditions and more complicated geological formations in the Barents Sea meant that 
cost of drilling per well is also much higher than that in the North Sea and the 
Norwegian Sea (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018c). The cost overruns and 
early production problems encountered by the only two operating fields of the Barents 
Sea, Snøhvit (natural gas production) and Goliat (oil production), as well as the 
subsequent failure to find significant discoveries in the wells drilled in  new exploration 
area in the Barents Sea southeast, highlight the high geological risk in the area, so 
much so that Equinor has decided to divert its exploration efforts away from the frontier 
areas (Hall, 2018; Holter, 2019b). This adds uncertainty to the availability of cheap 
natural gas for blue hydrogen production. 
6.4.1.1 Hydropower  
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Higher efficiency by upgrading and extension 
projects: Norway finished the year 2018 with 1 626 hydropower plants of  a total 
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production capacity of 32 257 MW and an average annual generation of about 135 
TWh  (NVE, 2019). Since the construction of a major controversial hydropower project 
in Alta which triggered massive protests from the indigenous community in the 1980s, 
no large-scale hydropower project was constructed for fear of public retaliation 
(Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014; Moe, 2015). Coupled with the fact that there remains 
few rivers and waterfalls for exploitation, it is unlikely that new dams will be built in the 
foreseeable future (Energy Facts Norway, 2019b; Moe, 2015). However, a recent 
study done by NTNU suggests that upgrading with extension of existing hydropower 
plants could potentially increase the total capacity by 10 to 15 per cent, that is an 
additional 22 to 30 TWh per year (Lia, Aas, & Killingtveit, 2017). This potential has not 
been taken into account in NVE’s long-term outlook for energy production until 2040, 
which could imply an additional surplus for more green hydrogen production (Veie et 
al., 2019).  
6.4.1.2 Wind power 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Rapidly falling LCOE for onshore wind: 
Despite having one of the best wind resources in Europe, with an average wind speed 
of 7-9 m/s at 50m above the ground in exposed areas in Norway, onshore wind power 
plant developments have been slow due to lack of sufficient subsidies, representing 
only 3% of 2018 electricity generation (IEA, 2017). After the establishment of the 
Norwegian-Swedish Green Certificate system in 2012, onshore wind power projects 
began to pick up growth, especially after 2017 when technological developments 
drove the levelized cost of energy (LCOE)12  down rapidly by -30% versus 2012 
(Bartnes et al., 2018; Moe, 2015). While the electricity certificate scheme has been 
extended from 2020 to 2036, wind power projects in Norway that are not operational 
by 31 Dec 2021 will not be entitled to receive the electricity certificates (Energy Facts 
Norway, 2019a). In spite of this, with the expected decline in LCOE of onshore wind, 
wind power in Norway can be profitable even without subsidies (Statnett, 2018). 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – World’s leading developer of offshore floating 
wind turbines: Unlike the offshore wind projects in Europe which consists of only 
bottom-fixed installations, the conditions of the seafloor topography in Norway, the 
                                                        
12 LCOE refers to the cost of energy generation per kWh over its lifetime, taking into account of the cost of 
ownership and use of the generation asset. 
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longer development area-to-land distances and deeper waters make it complicated 
and more expensive to install similar bottom-fixed offshore wind installations (Veie et 
al., 2019). For this reason, Norway’s offshore wind projects are focused on floating 
wind turbines, of which Equinor is the world’s leading developer (Equinor ASA, 2019c). 
Following the commissioning of the world’s first full-scale commercial 30MW floating 
wind farm, Hywind Scotland, in 2017, Equinor is currently working on building the 
world’s largest floating offshore wind park, Hywind Tampen, capable of producing  384 
GWh of electricity per year to power the oil and gas platforms in the Tampen area in 
the North Sea by 2022 (ASA, 2019; Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2019). As 
the technological maturity of floating offshore wind is still far behind fixed offshore wind, 
the development costs today are significantly higher and not economically profitable 
(Veie et al., 2019). Hence, NVE’s “medium” scenario foresees offshore wind in Norway 
picking up growth from 2040 onwards, when reductions in the LCOE reach a profitable 
level driven by technological advances and economies of scale. 
Barrier (green hydrogen) – Major protests against onshore wind projects:  
Since 2017, the number of onshore wind power plants installed in Norway has seen a 
rapid increase which triggered major protests across the country (Karagiannopoulos 
& Adomaitis, 2019). The public opposition has led to majority of the municipalities to 
reject the proposal for a national onshore wind power framework which identified 13 
areas with the highest potential for onshore wind projects with regards to the wind 
conditions and environmental impact (Solberg, Skel, & Befring, 2019). With the 
national framework being shelved, the approval of new onshore wind projects is at a 
standstill. This corresponds to NVE’s “medium” scenario on the market analysis, 
where all the onshore wind projects that have already obtained the green certificates 
by 2019 will be built, while new onshore wind projects will not be approved (Veie et al., 
2019). In the eventuality that public resistance gains more traction, there is a risk that 
approved onshore wind projects which are not built by 2023 may have their certificates 
withdrawn, limiting the peak to 19 TWh in 2025 with no further developments until 
2040 (“low scenario”) (Veie et al., 2019). 
6.4.2 Hydrogen production technologies 
Norway has a long track record for producing hydrogen at large scale, which 
dates as far back as the 1920s where hydropower electricity was used to power water 
electrolysis for ammonia fertilizer production during the pre-petroleum era, but this  
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method was later replaced by the more cost-efficient production method, the SMR in 
1963 after the discovery of hydrocarbons in the NCS. Therefore, this section will limit 
the review to the current two most dominant technologies for blue and green hydrogen 
production, that is SMR and CCS, and water electrolysis respectively. 
6.4.2.1 SMR 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) – Mature technology for hydrogen production via 
SMR: The SMR is a mature technology which uses natural gas as both fuel and 
feedstock, where natural gas is burnt as fuel in order to generate heat and energy for 
1) converting the natural gas feedstock into methane, 2) producing steam which allows 
methane to react with a catalyst and be converted into syngas made up of hydrogen, 
carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, 3) producing heat in the water-gas-shift reactor 
in which water and the carbon monoxide produced are converted into carbon dioxide 
and more hydrogen is produced, and lastly for 4) separating hydrogen from the syngas 
via pressure-swing adsorption (IEA, 2019c; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019; van 
Cappellen et al., 2018). When CCS is applied to SMR plants, the current carbon 
capture rate is limited to 90% (IEA, 2019c; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019; van 
Cappellen et al., 2018). Nonetheless, owing to the favourable economics afforded by 
its technological maturity, SMR is likely to be the leading technology for large-scale 
production of hydrogen in the near term, provided CCS makes further technological 
advancements (IEA, 2019c). 
6.4.2.2 CCS technology 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) – World leader in the CCS technology: CCS has 
been implemented for more than twenty years since 1996, making Norway a world 
leader in the technology. Currently, Norway boasts of two large-scale CCS facilities in 
Sleipner field (since 1996) and a LNG production plant at Snøhvit field (since 2008), 
both being operated by Equinor (former Statoil), both of which have successfully been 
storing close to 1.7 million tons of CO2 annually (Global CCS Institute, 2018; 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019b; Storset et al., 2019). Further, since 2012 
Norway has the world’s largest test centre for the development and validation of 
industrial-scale CCS technologies, Technology Centre Mongstad (TCM). (Storset et 
al., 2019). 
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Enabler (blue hydrogen) – Full-scale CCS demonstration project 
underway: Norway may be on its way to becoming the first to launch an industrial 
CCS project in Europe that involves carbon capture of flue gas using post-combustion 
method (where CO2 is captured after combustion) from two industrial sites, Norcem, 
a cement factory in Brevik and Fortum Oslo Varme, a waste-to-energy recovery plant 
in Oslo (Gassnova, 2018; Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2016). The sequestered 
carbon will then be  transported to an onshore facility on the west coast of Norwegian 
by ship for temporary storage before being transported through a pipeline to a subsea 
formation in the North Sea for permanent storage (Gassnova, 2018; Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2016). The learnings from the project could help industries 
around the world overcome barriers to the uptake of CCS, such as cost and scale. 
The project is expected to commence operations in 2023/2024 after the approval of 
the funding by the Norwegian Parliament which is expected to be finalised in 
2020/2021 (Bellona Europa, 2018; Fortum, 2018; Gassnova, 2018; Norcem, n.d.-b). 
Norcem aims to be become emission-free by 2030 (Norcem, n.d.-a). In addition, the 
success realization of the project will open up future opportunities for CO2 storage 
from other projects, such as those from the Magnum project in Netherland which is 
expected to be completed in 2023 (Equinor ASA, 2017; Gigler & Weeda, 2018). 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – CCS is energy intensive: Despite having 2 large-
scale CCS facilities in operation, where CO2 is being captured from natural gas, CCS 
technology for application in power stations and industrial plants requires carbon 
capture from flue gas, which is technically more complicated (Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy, 2014). One of the biggest technical barriers is the large amount of energy 
needed, which translates to significant cost (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014). 
Based on current state of technology, the cost of CO2 capture could cost between 80 
USD/tCO2 and 115 USD/tCO2 (IEA, 2019c)..Recent research in the technology 
claimed to have found solutions that can potentially reduce the energy requirement 
significantly, some of which would be implemented in the full-scale CCS 
demonstration project, and if successful, the cost of the technology would be 
significantly reduced (Storset et al., 2019). 
6.4.2.3 Water electrolysis 
Electrolysers and fuel cells technology are similar, except that the processes 
are reverse. While water electrolysis requires the use of an electrolyser to split water 
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in hydrogen and oxygen so that hydrogen can be extracted, fuel cells are used to 
produce direct current by recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water (Adolf et 
al., 2017). Therefore, to simplify, the points in this section applies to both technologies, 
but only electrolyser technology will be mentioned. There are currently three main 
types of electrolysers:  alkaline (ALK) electrolysers, proton exchange membrane (PEM) 
electrolysers and solid oxide electrolyser cell (SOEC). Of the three electrolysers, ALK 
is the most well-suited electrolyser for large-scale centralised hydrogen production 
where electricity supply is stable, that is either generated either directly from 
hydropower or from the electricity grid. PEM is more well-suited for hydrogen 
production where electricity supply is generated from VRE due to its higher flexibility 
(with a cold start-up time of 5 to 10 min. vs. ALK: 1 to 2 hours) and capacity to supply 
hydrogen within a short period of time period or where space is a constraint (IEA, 
2019c; IRENA, 2018b). Although introduced since the 1960s, market maturity is at 
early stage and is mostly used for small-scale applications as due to high costs related  
to the significant use of precious metals like platinum and iridium and short lifetime 
(about half of ALK) (IEA, 2019c; IRENA, 2018b).  
SOEC could potentially be a game-changer with very high electrical efficiency 
and material cost is relatively low as it uses mainly ceramics and few rare materials 
(IEA, 2019c; IRENA, 2018b). Moreover, it may be used in reverse to convert hydrogen 
back to electricity or used for power grid balancing services, and can be used to 
produce synthetic fuel (IEA, 2019c; IRENA, 2018b). However, the high operating 
temperature means that lifetime is short due to rapid degradation of materials (IEA, 
2019c; IRENA, 2018b). Also, SOEC technology is relatively new (developed since the 
1970s) which has only been tested in labs at small scale and has not been 
commercialised yet, creating a high level of uncertainty about investment costs (Buttler 
& Spliethoff, 2018; IEA, 2015, 2019c; IRENA, 2018b). A 20MW power plant using 
SOEC technology is expected to start operations for the production of low-carbon 
synthetic crude oil only in 2020 (Doyle, 2019; Sunfire.de, 2017). 
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Table 4: Techno-economic characteristics of different electrolyser technologies 
 
Sources: (a) Buttler & Spliethoff (2018); (b) IEA (2019c); (c) Schmidt et al. (2017); (d) Schnuelle et al. 
(2019) 
Based the above-mentioned reasons, ALK electrolyser is likely to be the choice 
of technology for large-scale production of green hydrogen for export in Norway in the 
short to long term, except in off-grid production, particularly in the case of offshore 
wind, PEM electrolyser would be the preferred choice. 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Pioneer in electrolyser technology: Since 
1927, NEL (previously the hydrogen electrolyser division of Hydro, NHEL) has played 
a central role in the development of water-electrolysis-based hydrogen production in 
Norway (Nel ASA, 2019; Norwegian Hydrogen Forum, 2016). In fact, NEL was 
responsible for developing the world’s first and largest electrolyser plant with a 
capacity of supplying 30 000 Nm3 of hydrogen per hour for the production of ammonia 
fertilizer in Rjukan (1929) and Glomfjord (1953) in Norway (Nel ASA, 2019). Following 
the switch from electrolysis to SMR for Hydro’s ammonia production in the 1980s and 
the incorporation of NHEL as a subsidiary of Hydro in 1993, NEL was forced to 
compensate for the loss of internal sales by reorganising itself to orient towards 
external industrial customers, which was one of the key drivers for its hydrogen 
ALK Electrolyser PEM Electrolyser SOEC Electrolyser
2017 2030 Long Term 2017 2030 Long Term 2017 2030 Long Term
State of the art (d) Mature technology
Early market maturity: commercially available 
but mostly used for small-scale applications
Not yet widely commercialised. Developed 
and demonstrated at lab scale.
Gas purity (c) > 99.5% 99.99% 99.99%
Electrical efficiency
(%, Lower Heating Value) (b)
63 - 70 65 - 71 70 - 80 56 - 60 63 - 68 67 - 74 74 - 81 77 - 84 77 - 90
Operating pressure (bar) (b) 1 - 30 30 - 80 1
Operating temperature (°C) (b) 60 - 80 50 - 80 650 - 1 000
Stack lifetime
('000 operating hours) (b)
60 - 90 90 - 100 100 - 150 30 - 90 60 - 90 100 - 150 10 - 30 40 - 60 75 - 100
Load range
(%, relative to nominal load) (b)
10-110 - - 0-160 - - 20-100 - -
Scaling potential (d) Large-scale operation Up-scaling in progress 20MW plant to start operating in 2020
Max. nominal power per stack 
(MW) (a)
6 - - 2 - - < 0.01 - -




1 400 - - 400 - - < 10 - -
Material cost (d) Low due to avoidance of previous metals
High due to use of expensive platinum 
catalyst and fluorinated membrane materials
Low due to avoidance of previous metals
CAPEX (USD/kW) (b) 500 - 1 400 400 - 850 200 - 700 1 100 - 1 800 650 - 1 500 200 - 900 2 800 - 5 600 800 - 2 800 500 - 1 000
Cold start-up time (a) 1-2h 2 -10 min hours
Warm start-up time (a) 1-5 min - - < 10 sec - - 15 min - -
Plant footprint (m
2
/kW) (b) 0.095 - - 0.048 - - - - -
Preferred application (d)
• Centralised large-scale production
• Preferably constantly in operation
• Low capacity for grid balancing
• Decentralised small to medium-scale 
production
• High security
• High capacity for grid balancing
• Centralised large-scale production
• Preferably near sites producing waste 
heat
• Low capacity for grid balancing
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initiatives and demonstrations both internationally (Iceland13 and Germany14) and 
domestically (Koefoed, 2011). One of the most important national initiatives, led by the 
then-managing director of NHEL, Christopher Kloed, was the establishment of the 
Norwegian Hydrogen Forum in 1996, which brought together a community of actors 
from the industry, environmental organisations, energy companies and research 
institutions in Norway to promote hydrogen as an energy carrier (Koefoed, 2011). 
Another notable legacy of Kloed was the launch of the HyNor project in 2003, which 
consists of building a hydrogen highway between Oslo and Stavanger (Koefoed, 2011; 
Sataøen, 2008). Today, NEL is the largest electrolyser producer in the world, 
specializing in both ALK and PEM (proton exchange membrane) technology, as well 
as a market leader in the manufacture of hydrogen fuelling stations (Nel ASA, 2019). 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Plans for large-scale centralised green 
hydrogen production plants: In anticipation of the demand for Hyundai hydrogen 
trucks that are expected to be ready in 2020 in Norway, NEL established Green H2 
Norway, a green hydrogen joint venture (JV) was established on 20th Dec 2019 with 
Greenstat (a green hydrogen industrial supplier in Norway), H2 Energy and Akerhus 
Energi, with the objective to be the exclusive supplier of green hydrogen for these 
trucks (Greenstat, 2019; H2 Energy, 2019; NEL ASA, 2019a). As part of the plan, a 
large-scale hydrogen production plant based on electrolysis is being planned just 
outside Oslo (Greenstat, 2019; H2 Energy, 2019; NEL ASA, 2019a).  
Barrier (green hydrogen) – Heavy reliance on rare precious metals for 
PEM electrolyser: If hydrogen production plant is powered directly by VRE, 
particularly offshore wind, PEM electrolyser would likely be the choice of technology 
owing to its load flexibility and short start-up time (Buttler & Spliethoff, 2018; IEA, 
2019c). This is also the preferred technology for fuel-cell-powered transport. However, 
PEM technology relies heavily on rare precious metals such as platinum and iridium, 
which are concentrated in few geological locations (Fernandez, 2017; Sealy, 2008), 
namely South Africa (73%) and Russia (11%) who were the two biggest producers of 
platinum in 2018 (Cowley, 2019). In addition, given that 95% of the current known 
                                                        
13 NEL delivered Iceland’s first HRS in 1999 as part of an EU-sponsored project, Ecological City Transport 
System (ECTOS) (Equinor ASA, 2019b). 
14 NEL partnered with German companies to deliver a HRS in Hamburg as part of EU-sponsored project, Clean 
Urban Transport for Europe (CUTE) in 2003 and in Berlin as part of Clean Energy Partnership (CEP) in 2004 
(Koefoed, 2011). 
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reserves are estimated to be located in South Africa, the level of geopolitical risk to 
the security of supply are estimated to be medium-to-high (Habib, Hamelin, & Wenzel, 
2016). Fortunately, some of the risk could be mitigated by recovering both precious 
metals from used catalysts in PEM electrolysers at a recycling rate of more than 90% 
and reuse them without significant loss in cell performance according to recent studies 
(Carmo et al., 2019). 
6.4.3 Hydrogen storage 
As hydrogen has a low volumetric energy density, hydrogen needs to be 
compressed or liquefied before being stored in order to achieve higher energy density 
comparable to other fuel and minimize the amount of storage space needed. Both 
hydrogen compression and liquefaction technology are mature technologies which 
have been deployed commercially in many countries (Hart et al., 2015), but the biggest 
challenge today is to make it cost-effective to store hydrogen at large scale (Niaz, 
Manzoor, & Pandith, 2015). This section will review the three forms in which hydrogen 
can be stored as: CGH2, LH2 gas and ammonia (a hydrogen-based fuel), as well as 
their respective storage vessel. 
6.4.3.1 Compressed hydrogen gas (CGH2) 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Compression process is less energy 
intensive than liquefaction: While both compression and liquefaction technology are 
mature, compression requires less energy than liquefaction. The energy consumption 
to compress hydrogen from 20 bar to 875 bar is 2.67 kWh/kgH2 whereas liquefaction 
currently consumes around 10 kWh/kgH2 on average, about 3.7 times more energy 
(Cardella, Decker, & Klein, 2017; van Cappellen et al., 2018). In addition, since most 
end-applications for hydrogen are gas-based, CGH2 can be used as it is, unlike LH2 
which needs to be re-gasified  (van Cappellen et al., 2018). 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Line packing in converted natural gas 
pipelines may be more expensive than other storage solutions: For large volumes 
of storage, compressed hydrogen could be line-packed in converted natural gas 
pipelines or newly built hydrogen pipelines. Line-packing is being used to store natural 
gas today and it consists of altering the pressure within the gas network (van 
Cappellen et al., 2018). However, research showed that pressure variations in natural 
gas pipelines with 100% hydrogen can lead to a growth of cracks in the pipeline 
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material ten times faster than with 100% natural gas (van Cappellen et al., 2018). 
Therefore, existing gas infrastructure needs to be converted first through additional 
reinforcements, maintenance and replacements, at potentially 5% to 30% of the cost 
of building a new gas network (van Cappellen et al., 2018). Given that a new gas 
pipeline entails very high capital costs, the conversion could end up costing more than 
other storage solutions. 
6.4.3.2 Liquid hydrogen (LH2) 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Higher volumetric energy density 
than CGH2: With a higher volumetric density of 70 kg/m3 compared to 30 kg/m3 for 
CGH2 at 700 bar pressure, more volume of LH2 can be stored in a given volume than 
compressed gas tanks (Hart et al., 2015; Niaz et al., 2015). Cryogenic storage tanks 
measuring 300m3 are already commercially available with a capacity to store 21 tons 
of LH2 and these could be used to provide seasonal storage of hydrogen on a local 
scale (NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019; van Cappellen et al., 2018). Currently, NASA 
owns the largest cryogenic storage tank in the world, which measures 3 800 m3 with 
a storage capacity of 270 tons of LH2 and future developments could see such tank 
becoming 13 times bigger with a capacity to store up to 3500 tons of LH2 (NCE 
Maritime CleanTech, 2019). 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – High potential for significant 
reduction of liquefaction cost: In order to convert hydrogen from gaseous state to 
liquid state, the temperature has to be lowered to minus -253°C (IEA, 2019c; Staffell 
et al., 2019; van Cappellen et al., 2018). Hydrogen liquefaction is typically done using 
state-of-the-art 5 tpd (tons per day) LH2 hydrogen liquefier, which results in a relatively 
high energy consumption of around 10 kWh/kg LH2 (Cardella et al., 2017). However, 
studies have shown that the specific energy consumption for liquefaction can be 
reduced to between 5.9 and 6.6 kWh/kg LH2 based on 100 tpd LH2 plant within the 
next 5 years, with the potential to reduce liquefaction costs by 67% compared to a 
conventional 5 tpd LH2 plant (Cardella et al., 2017). 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – No hydrogen liquefaction facility in 
Norway: At present, there are no hydrogen liquefaction facility in Norway although 
two medium-scale liquefaction plants (between 5 to 20 tpd LH2) are being planned, of 
which one is at Equinor’s Tjeldbergodden plant and another in Kvinnherad by Gasnor 
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(gas supplier), Sunnhordland Kraftlag (hydropower) and the Kvinnherad municipal 
(NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). The only large-scale hydrogen liquefaction plants 
exist in North America, which were built for NASA during the space race (NCE 
Maritime CleanTech, 2019). In Europe, liquid hydrogen is being produced at medium 
scale (between 5 to 10 tpd LH2) in France, Germany and Netherlands (NCE Maritime 
CleanTech, 2019). The market for commercial liquefaction plants are currently 
dominated by the Linde group (Germany), Air Liquid (France) and Air Products (USA) 
(NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). In terms of the know-how, Norway may be at a 
disadvantage compared to its European neighbours. 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Unsuitable for long-term storage due 
to boil-off: An estimated 0.2% to 0.5% of LH2 per day is lost due to the boil-off 
phenomenon as the unavoidable heat enters the storage vessel during  the loading 
and unloading process, regardless of how well the insulation is (Bouwkamp et al., 
2017; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019; Zhang et al., 2016). This makes it challenging 
to store and transport LH2 for an extended period of time. 
6.4.3.3 Liquid ammonia (NH3) 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – World’s largest ammonia producer: 
Since the 1920s, Norsk Hydro (now Yara), the largest ammonia producer in the world, 
has been producing ammonia fertilizers using hydrogen via water electrolysis in 
Norway (IEA, 2019c; Nel ASA, 2019; Norwegian Hydrogen Forum, 2016). Since late 
1980s, Norsk Hydro switched to using the SMR method to produce the hydrogen 
feedstock for manufacturing ammonia fertilizers following the discovery of petroleum 
(Koefoed, 2011). However, as part of its sustainability efforts, Yara signed an 
agreement with NEL in August 2019 to produce green ammonia in Norway by 
leveraging on the latter’s next generation alkaline electrolyser (Nel ASA, 2019; Yara 
International ASA, 2019). If liquid ammonia is to become a hydrogen carrier for long-
distance transport, Yara could potentially become a key player in boosting the 
prospects of green hydrogen, particularly if it is serious in becoming carbon neutral by 
2050 (Yara International ASA, 2019).  
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Less energy demanding than 
liquefaction: 1 kg of ammonia requires 10 to 12 kWh to produce, including the energy 
used for hydrogen production via water electrolysis (Andersson & Grönkvist, 2019; 
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Brekke, Møller-Holst, Sundseth, Ødegård, & Brekke, 2018). Excluding the energy 
input for electricity used in water electrolysis of around 7 kWh (theoretically speaking), 
converting hydrogen to ammonia requires around 2 to 4 kWh/kg NH3 (Andersson & 
Grönkvist, 2019; Bruce et al., 2018; Giddey, Badwal, Munnings, & Dolan, 2017). 
Compared to the energy input for liquefaction (currently at around 10 kWh/ kg LH2) 
(Cardella et al., 2017, the prospects for hydrogen storage in ammonia look promising. 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Higher hydrogen storage density 
than LH2: With a density of 682.61 kg/m3 (Aarnes et al., 2019) and a high gravimetric 
hydrogen storage density of 17.7% (Andersson & Grönkvist, 2019), liquid ammonia 
has a volumetric hydrogen density of 121 kg/m3 (stored at a temperature of -33˚C and 
1 bar), which is around 1.7 times more than in LH2  with 70 kg/m3 at 1 bar (Andersson 
& Grönkvist, 2019; Bruce et al., 2018; IEA, 2019c). Its high energy density of 4 300 
kWh/m3 means that large volumes of energy can be stored in a small space (Sadler & 
Anderson, 2018). 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Potential long-term energy storage 
medium: Liquid ammonia is typically stored a single- or doubled-walled and 
refrigerated storage tank, and the biggest tank to date is built in Qatar, measuring 50 
meters in diameter and 40.5 meters in height, with a storage capacity of 50 000 tonnes 
(Sadler & Anderson, 2018). 5 such tanks can store as much energy as 10 salt-cavern 
hydrogen storage sites, which makes liquid ammonia an attractive alternative to liquid 
hydrogen as an inter-seasonal hydrogen storage (Giddey et al., 2017; IEA, 2019c). 
Furthermore, since ammonia liquefies at -33°C at bar 1 pressure and stay liquefied at 
room temperature at around bar 10, it is subjected to much less energy loss through 
boil-off and the operational cost of storage is lower than liquid H2 due to less energy 
needed to maintain the storage vessel at cool temperature (Andersson & Grönkvist, 
2019; Giddey et al., 2017). A study in 2008 estimates the cost of hydrogen storage in 
liquid ammonia form to be USD 0.54/kg H2 as compared to liquid H2 at USD 14.95/kg 
H2 for six months (Philibert, 2017; Valera-Medina, Xiao, Owen-Jones, David, & Bowen, 
2018).  
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – High energy consumption for 
ammonia cracking to extract hydrogen: In most cases, ammonia needs to go 
through a dehydrogenation process called ammonia cracking before it can be used in 
hydrogen end-use applications in the receiving importing country (Andersson & 
 49 
Grönkvist, 2019; Giddey et al., 2017; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). The most 
common method to “crack” or decompose ammonia is through thermolysis, which 
requires the use of ruthenium-based catalysts at high temperatures of typically above 
650˚C, in order to achieve complete conversion of ammonia to hydrogen (Andersson 
& Grönkvist, 2019; Giddey et al., 2017). Assuming an electricity consumption of 2.8 
kWh/kg m3 NH3 for ammonia cracking and 85% hydrogen recovery rate from ammonia, 
the energy penalty for ammonia cracking is estimated to be 14.1 kWh/kg H2, which is 
higher than liquefaction (Giddey et al., 2017).  The dehydrogenation of ammonia may 
eventually be bypassed if solid oxide fuel cells (SOFC) technology matures as the 
cracking can leverage on the high operating temperature and occur within the latter, 
or if ammonia is used as feedstock in alkaline membrane fuel cells (AFC) (currently at 
early development phase) (Giddey et al., 2017; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Challenges in scaling up ammonia 
cracking process: For large-scale conversion, ruthenium-based catalysts are not 
feasible due to the high operating costs incurred to achieve high temperature and the 
need for more expensive reactor materials to support the heat (Andersson & Grönkvist, 
2019; Giddey et al., 2017). To scale up the conversion process, recent research on 
the use of alkali-based catalysts such as sodium and lithium looks promising in 
lowering the cracking temperature to below 500°C (Andersson & Grönkvist, 2019; 
Valera-Medina et al., 2018). 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Purification of hydrogen after 
ammonia cracking: With the industry feedstock and transportation sector accounting 
for majority of the demand for hydrogen, hydrogen needs to go through a purification 
process after the dehydrogenation process from ammonia in order to increase its 
purity level to more than 99.99% (Giddey et al., 2017). This translates into additional 
cost and lower overall efficiency. 
6.4.4 Hydrogen transport 
6.4.4.1 Pipelines 
Enabler (blue hydrogen) / Barrier (green hydrogen) – Possibility to 
leverage on existing gas pipelines: There is currently close to 8 000 km of high-
pressure subsea pipelines connecting Norway to Europe (Skar et al., 2018) These 
pipelines could be converted into hydrogen pipelines for exporting hydrogen to EU 
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when they are no longer in use for natural gas exports. However, since majority of the 
gas pipelines is jointly owned by Gassled in partnership with all the major oil and gas 
companies, including Equinor and wholly stated-owned Petoro, it is likely that the 
transmission via gas pipelines will prioritize blue hydrogen over green hydrogen 
(Gassco, 2019; Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019g, 2019h).  
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – Risk of hydrogen embrittlement of pipelines: 
The existing gas pipelines connecting Norway to Europe are typically made of high-
strength steel such as API 5L X65 and X70 and has a high pressure capacity of about 
150 bar which allows natural gas to be transported over long distances without 
compressor stations along the way (Aarnes et al., 2019). Unlike the existing polythene 
natural gas pipelines in the UK and other parts of Europe which operates at a  limit of 
7 bar pressure, the  higher operating pressure in subsea pipelines make them more 
prone to hydrogen embrittlement and may not be easily repurposed for the transport 
of 100% pure hydrogen (Aarnes et al., 2019; IEA, 2019c; Staffell et al., 2017). While 
the rate of hydrogen embrittlement could be slowed down by lowering the maximum 
operating pressure to about 55% of the current limits for natural gas transport without 
hydrogen, this would significantly reduce the transport capacity of hydrogen to only 
30% of current transport capacity based on natural gas (Aarnes et al., 2019).  
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Dedicated hydrogen pipelines are 
costly to build: Although the most economical way for transporting large volumes of 
hydrogen over distances less than 1 500 km is through pipelines, the upfront capital 
cost for building a new network of subsea hydrogen pipelines is expected to be more 
expensive than building a new natural gas pipeline due to considerations related to 
hydrogen embrittlement (Andersson & Grönkvist, 2019; Bouwkamp et al., 2017). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that such pipelines will be built unless it can be justified by a 
significant volume of long-term hydrogen demand. In the USA, the capital cost for 
building a hydrogen transmission pipeline is estimated to be around USD 1 million per 
mile (USD 625K per km) and are generally installed in areas with where the daily 
hydrogen demand is at least hundreds of thousands of kg and remains stable for at 
least 15 to 30 years (Bouwkamp et al., 2017). 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Prototype stage for hydrogen-
compatible pipeline compressors: Since hydrogen has a density of low molecular 
weight compared to natural gas, the volume flow in the pipeline needs to be three 
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times more than natural gas in order to deliver the same energy capacity (Witkowski, 
Rusin, Majkut, & Stolecka, 2017). However, as hydrogen travels through the gas 
pipelines, a drop in pressure may occur due to various factors like changes in 
temperature or flow velocity, which can result in choking conditions (Witkowski et al., 
2017). To mitigate this problem, centrifugal compressors are typically installed at 
regular spacing along the pipeline to re-pressurize the gas (Staffell et al., 2017, 2019; 
Witkowski et al., 2017). However, conventional centrifugal compressors not designed 
to handle hydrogen at high volume flow rate (Staffell et al., 2017, 2019; Witkowski et 
al., 2017) A multi-stage centrifugal compressor is being developed to overcome this, 
but the technology is still at prototype stage (Bouwkamp et al., 2017; Di Bella, 2015; 
Witkowski et al., 2017). 
6.4.4.2 Ships 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Low transport cost for ammonia-
based hydrogen carrier: While ammonia production and ammonia cracking are 
highly energy intensive which lead to high production cost, the relatively low 
transportation costs make ammonia an attractive hydrogen carrier (IEA, 2019c). In 
addition to having a higher hydrogen storage density than LH2, ammonia can be 
shipped by existing chemical and semi-refrigerated liquefied petroleum gas tankers 
which has an established intercontinental transmission and distribution network, 
making it much cheaper to transport at USD 1.20/kg H2 compared to LH2 at USD 2/kg 
H2, including cost of conversion prior to shipping (IEA, 2019c). As such, a number of 
projects like H21 North of England (Sadler & Anderson, 2018) and Australia’s National 
Hydrogen Roadmap (Bruce et al., 2018) have considered ammonia as a possible 
hydrogen carrier in their scenarios. It was also recommended as an energy carrier in 
the study of energy transition towards RE in Svalbard (Aarnes et al., 2019; Brekke et 
al., 2018). 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – First liquid hydrogen transport 
vessel launched in 2019: As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, the large-scale transport of 
liquid hydrogen by sea is not feasible under current restrictions of the IGC and IMDG, 
which limit the volume permissible and the location of containers on board of cargo 
ships (Hylaw, n.d.; NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). Following the signing of a 
memorandum between Australia and Japan in 2017 to allow the transportation of LH2 
in bulk in specialized ships (Australian Maritime Safety Authority, 2017; Kyodo, 2017),  
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Kawaski Heavy Industries (KHI), the first Asian company to build LNG transport 
vessels, developed and launched the world’s first liquid hydrogen carrier in Dec 2019 
(Bruce et al., 2018; Harding, 2019; Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., 2019a, 2019b). 
The vessel, Suiso Frontier, runs on diesel and will be installed with a 1 250 m3 vacuum-
insulated double-shell hydrogen storage tank, as part of a pilot project to transport LH2 
from Victoria in Australia to Japan in 16 days by end of 2020 (Bruce et al., 2018; 
Harding, 2019; Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., 2019a, 2019b). The trials will serve 
as a building block for the design and construction of a commercial-scale hydrogen-
powered vessel with a storage capacity of 160 000 m3, equivalent to four tanks of 
modern LNG carriers, by around 2030 (Harding, 2019).  
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – High transport cost for LH2: Assuming 
the successful implementation of a commercial scale LH2 tanker ship of 160 000 m3 
storage capacity by 2030, the transport cost is expected to be USD 2/kg H2, almost 
double that of liquid ammonia (USD 1.20/kg H2) (IEA, 2019c, 2019a). Part of the high 
cost may be attributed to the fact that the transport vessel is assumed to return to the 
port of origin with an empty tank, unless another high-value liquid can be transported 
on its way back (IEA, 2019c). 
6.5 Environmental factors (E) 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Regional GHG emissions reduction: 
According to van Cappellen et al. (2018), the carbon footprint of blue hydrogen 
production in Norway ranges between 0.82 and 1.14 kg CO2e/kg H2 today, whereas 
based on the emission factor of Norwegian electricity mix of 17 g of CO2/kWh, green 
hydrogen production in Norway results in a carbon footprint of 1.13 kg CO2e/kg H2 and 
0.92 kg CO2e/kg H2 in 2015 and 2030 respectively. Compared to its neighbours in 
Europe, such as Netherlands, the GHG emissions from hydrogen production are 
significantly higher than that of Norway in both 2015 and 2030 (van Cappellen et al., 
2018). 
Enabler (green hydrogen) – Water availability: In theory, 1 kg of hydrogen 
requires around 8 to 9 L of water (IEA, 2019c; Schnuelle et al., 2019). However, after 
taking into account of the water loss in the purification process, around 15 L of water 
is needed to produce 1kg of hydrogen or 0.45 L per kWhH2, that is, to produce 1 TWh 
of hydrogen, a volume of 450 million L of water is needed (Schnuelle et al., 
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2019).   Although the water consumption via electrolysis is roughly double that of blue 
hydrogen production, the fact that Norway has an abundant supply of surface water 
makes this parameter less critical for the production of green hydrogen (IEA, 2019b). 
As a matter of fact, Norway is endowed with a storage capacity of water resources 
equivalent to half of Europe’s reservoir storage capacity (Energy Facts Norway, 
2019b). 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) / Enabler (green hydrogen) – Depleting natural 
gas resource: The prospects of blue hydrogen production depends highly on the 
availability of natural gas resources. Table 6 shows the total estimated natural gas 
resources on the NCS as at end of 2017. According to the NPD (2018e), the natural 
gas resources that have been discovered as at end of 2017 stood at 2.3 bcm o.e.15 
(36% of the total estimated resource of 6.5 bcm o.e.). Assuming a constant average 
annual export volume of 120 bcm o.e. (based on average production forecast between 
2018 and 2023) and that all the discovered resources can be 100% extracted, the 
resources is expected to last about 19 years until 2036 (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2019f, 2019a). Assuming that all the undiscovered resources can be fully 
extracted and exported at the same average volume, the natural gas resources would 
last another 15 years until 2052. However, the reality shows that the production output 
is expected to start declining after mid-2020s due to lower recovery rates in maturing 
fields and in undiscovered fields which are expected to be smaller in size, as can be 
observed in Figure 8. Hence, the production timeline may extend for a longer period 
but with decreasing export volume every year. 
Table 5: Total natural gas resources on the NCS as at 31 Dec 2017.  
 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2018d) 
 
                                                        
15 bcm o.e. stands for billion cubic meters of oil equivalent, where 1 Sm3 o.e. is equivalent to 1 000 Sm3 of 
natural gas (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019c). 
Gas (million scm oe) 2017 North Sea Norwegian Sea Barents Sea
Sold and delivered 2,341              
Reserves 1,729              1,152                       400                            177                            
Contingent resources 605                   350                            208                            48                               
Undiscovered 1,870              245                            395                            1,230                       
6,545              1,747                       1,003                       1,455                       
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Figure 8: Sales volume forecast of gas from Norwegian fields until 2035. Source: Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate (2019d) 
Furthermore, the high uncertainties due to the lack of information on the 
geology in the Barents Sea and the perceived low profitability of its undiscovered fields 
by major oil companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Total and Shell (Adomaitis, 
2018, 2019b; Bousso & Nasralla, 2019) may result in the failure to extract from the 
undiscovered fields in the Barents Sea to offset the decline. Excluding the 
undiscovered fields in the Barents Sea, the total natural gas resources in the NCS 
would probably last until 2042, assuming an average gas export volume of 120 bcm 
o.e. per year. This would likely have serious implications for the return on investment 
on the technologies related to blue hydrogen production, particularly CCS. 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – Fugitive emissions from CCS: While using CCS 
can significantly reduce the carbon footprint of blue hydrogen, the current carbon 
capture rate for SMR with CCS is at 90% with an emission intensity of 0.99 kg CO2e/kg 
H2 and 95% for ATR with CCS with emission intensity of 0.64 kg CO2e/kg H2 (IRENA, 
2019; van Cappellen et al., 2018). This means that 5 to 10% of all the CO2 generated 
from blue hydrogen production will be leaked, increasing the carbon footprint of the 
country where the site of production is located. In addition, there is potentially a risk of 
fugitive methane emissions along the value chain of gas due to flaring, venting or 
leakage, which needs to be addressed for it to be truly a sustainable solution in the 
energy transition. 
Barrier (blue and green hydrogen) – Ammonia is highly toxic: If hydrogen 
is stored in the form of ammonia, one should note that it is highly toxic and can be life-
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threatening or fatal when exposed for too long at high concentration of ammonia in the 
air, requiring careful handling by professionally trained operators (IEA, 2019c; Valera-
Medina et al., 2018). Fortunately, ammonia has a distinctive odour that allows for easy 
detection of leaks at very low concentrations (Philibert, 2017). Despite  the existence 
of well-established and tested health and safety protocols, as well as regulations for 
handling ammonia in all aspects of industrial applications which can help to minimize 
the risk of exposure, negative public perception of the toxicity of ammonia and of its 
strong odour even at low concentrations may impede deployment of ammonia as a 
hydrogen-based fuel (Valera-Medina et al., 2018).  
6.6 Legal factors (L) 
Enabler (blue and green hydrogen) – Existing regulations and standards 
for hydrogen production: While there are no hydrogen-specific regulations in 
hydrogen, the production of hydrogen in Norway generally follows the regulations set 
by the Act on protection against fire, explosion and accidents with dangerous 
substances, which calls for risk assessments and demarcation of safety zones around 
the production facility (NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). For production and onsite 
storage of hydrogen of volumes more than 5 tons, consent must be requested from 
the Directorate for Civil Protection and the Major Accident Regulation must be followed 
with additional duties and responsibilities (NCE Maritime CleanTech, 2019). 
Barrier (green hydrogen) – Lack of a standard for green hydrogen: To 
distinguish green hydrogen from other types of hydrogen that are produced from fossil 
fuels, global certification scheme is necessary to allow one to trace back to the origins 
of the hydrogen, but this requires first and foremost, an established standard for green 
hydrogen (Staffell et al., 2019). Depending on the energy resources and priorities of 
the country, green hydrogen standards are defined differently, varying from hydrogen 
produced from only RE sources, to those produced from low-carbon sources which 
include nuclear and CCS (Staffell et al., 2019). Without a common green hydrogen 
standard agreed with the EU, the prospects for green hydrogen exports could be 
negatively impacted. 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – Limitations on hydrogen blend in the gas grid: 
One of the ways being explored for transportation of hydrogen is in the form of blended 
natural gas using the existing natural gas pipelines. However, the current allowable 
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limits for hydrogen blend in natural gas in the EU are set at arbitrarily low levels and 
varies from country to country (Aarnes et al., 2019; Quarton & Samsatli, 2018). For 
example, the legal limits set in UK is at 0.1%, whereas in Germany and Netherlands, 
the limits are 10% and 12% respectively (Quarton & Samsatli, 2018; Staffell et al., 
2019). However, even if the legal limits are relaxed, studies show that the maximum 
allowable mix of hydrogen in the gas grid without the need for major upgrades to the 
current infrastructure and the need for major adjustments to end appliances is at 20% 
in volume. In addition, industries which rely on carbon content for its processes or use 
gas engines and turbines that are not designed to tolerate hydrogen blend of more 
than 2% will not be able to use the newly blended gas without pre-treatment (IEA, 
2019c). Hence, this would mean that this pathway would not be feasible for a deep 
decarbonisation of the EU. 
Barrier (blue hydrogen) – London protocol: According to Article 6 of the 
London Protocol, it is prohibited to export waste for the purpose of dumping at sea 
(IMO, 2019). This implies that if Norway exports blue hydrogen to Europe by way of 
transporting natural gas to the recipient country and reforming it on-site with CCS, the 
CO2 captured needs to be stored in that country or on land in another European 
country (Aarnes et al., 2019). In early Oct 2019, a provisional application of the 2009 
amendment of Article 6 of the London Protocol was approved to allow cross-border 
transport and export of CO2 for storage purposes in sub-seabed geological formations 
(Global CCS Institute, 2019). This means that Norway will be able to transport the CO2 
out of Europe and store it in the Norwegian continental shelf. However, only CO2 
transported by pipelines and stored in geological formations can benefit from the 
carbon price under the EU ETS system, while projects that count on transporting CO2 
via ships and trucks are currently excluded (Global CCS Institute, 2019). 
Table 7 attempts to list the PESTEL factors in two columns, blue hydrogen and 
green hydrogen, and highlighting the enablers and barriers in large-scale export of 





Table 6: PESTEL analysis 
 Blue Hydrogen Green Hydrogen 
Political Enabler:  
• CCS as a political glue 
• A petro-industrial complex 
• Rising carbon prices and tax 
• Deep decarbonization of the EU by 
2050 
Barrier: 
• Diminishing political support for 
further offshore exploration 
Enabler: 
• Rising carbon prices and tax 
• Deep decarbonization of the EU by 
2050 
Barrier: 
• A petro-industrial complex 
Economics Enabler: 
• A growing global demand for 
hydrogen 
• Limited electricity surplus in the EU 
due to low curtailment rates of 
VRE 
• Access to substantial natural gas 
resource  
• Lower risk of stranded assets 
Barrier: 
• Cutback on fossil fuel funding from 
EIB 
Enabler: 
• A growing global demand for 
hydrogen 
• Limited electricity surplus in the EU 
due to low curtailment rates of VRE 
• Low electricity prices 
• Cutback on fossil fuel funding from 
EIB 
Social Enabler: 
• Heavy reliance on oil and gas 
export for social welfare  
• Concerns about electricity being 
an energy export 
• General public receptiveness 
towards hydrogen  
• Barrier: 
• Rising climate change awareness 
among youths 
• Uncertainty over the future of oil 
and gas  
• Concerns for the safety and 
reliability of hydrogen 
Enabler: 
• Rising climate change awareness 
among youths 
• Uncertainty over the future of oil 
and gas 
• Concerns about electricity being an 
energy export 
• General public receptiveness 
towards hydrogen 
Barrier: 
• Heavy reliance on oil and gas 
export for social welfare 
• Concerns for the safety and 





• Decreasing average cost per 
development well 
Barrier: 
• Lack of infrastructure and limited 
gas transport capacity in the 
Barents Sea 
• High geological risks in the Barents 
Sea 
Enabler: 
• Higher efficiency by upgrading and 
extension of hydropower projects 
• Rapidly falling LCOE for onshore 
wind 
• World’s leading developer for 
offshore wind power 
Barrier: 






• Mature technology for hydrogen 
production via SMR 
• World leader in CCS technology 
• Full-scale CCS demonstration 
project underway 
Barrier: 
• CCS is energy intensive 
Enabler: 
• Pioneer in electrolyser technology 
• Plans for large-scale centralised 
green hydrogen production plants 
Barrier: 
• Heavy reliance on rare precious 





• Compression process is less 
energy intensive than liquefaction 
Enabler: 
• Compression process is less energy 
intensive than liquefaction 
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• LH2 has higher volumetric energy 
density than CGH2 
• High potential for significant 
reduction in liquefaction cost 
• World’s largest ammonia producer 
• Ammonia production is less energy 
demanding than liquefaction 
• Ammonia has higher hydrogen 
storage density than LH2 
• Ammonia as a potential long-term 
energy storage medium 
Barrier: 
• Line packing in converted natural 
gas pipelines may be more 
expensive than other storage 
solutions 
• No hydrogen liquefaction facility in 
Norway 
• LH2 unsuitable for long-term 
storage due to boil-off 
• High energy consumption for 
ammonia cracking to extract 
hydrogen 
• Challenges in scaling up ammonia 
cracking process 
• Purification of hydrogen after 
ammonia cracking 
• LH2 has higher volumetric energy 
density than CGH2 
• High potential for significant 
reduction in liquefaction cost 
• World’s largest ammonia producer 
• Ammonia production is less energy 
demanding than liquefaction 
• Ammonia has higher hydrogen 
storage density than LH2 
• Ammonia as a potential long-term 
energy storage medium 
Barrier: 
• Line packing in converted natural 
gas pipelines may be more 
expensive than other storage 
solutions 
• No hydrogen liquefaction facility in 
Norway 
• LH2 unsuitable for long-term storage 
due to boil-off 
• High energy consumption for 
ammonia cracking to extract 
hydrogen 
• Challenges in scaling up ammonia 
cracking process 






• Possibility to leverage on existing 
gas pipelines  
• Low transport cost for ammonia-
based hydrogen carrier 
• First liquid hydrogen transport 
vessel launched in 2019 
Barrier: 
• Risk of hydrogen embrittlement of 
pipelines 
• Dedicated hydrogen pipelines are 
costly to build 
• Prototype stage for hydrogen-
compatible pipeline compressors 
• High transport cost for LH2 
Enabler: 
• Low transport cost for ammonia-
based hydrogen carrier 
• First liquid hydrogen transport 
vessel launched in 2019 
Barrier: 
• Leveraging on existing gas pipelines 
• Dedicated hydrogen pipelines are 
costly to build 
• Prototype stage for hydrogen-
compatible pipeline compressors 
• High transport cost for LH2 
Environmental Enabler: 
• Regional GHG emissions reduction  
Barrier: 
• Depleting natural gas reserves 
• Fugitive methane emissions 
Enabler: 
• Regional GHG emissions reduction 
• Water availability 
• Depleting natural gas reserves 
Legal Enabler: 
• Existing regulations and standards 
for hydrogen production 
Barrier: 
• Limitation in hydrogen blend in gas 
grid 
• London protocol 
Enabler: 
• Existing regulations and standards 





Using the MLP framework, this section presents a summary of the key findings 
from the PESTEL analysis to set a common starting point for the construction of the 
narratives in the next sub-section for the four contextual futures scenarios briefly 
described in section 5.1. This is then followed by a discussion of these scenarios with 
respect to the research questions (Section 7.2), on how the prospects of blue and 
green hydrogen production in Norway for energy export vary in each scenario and how 
different conditions affect the nature of the interactions between hydrogen and the 
regime, as well as the broader landscape. 
Sociotechnical Landscape 
The sociotechnical landscape is predominantly influenced by developments in 
the energy transition in the EU, which in turn is driven by two key factors: climate 
security and energy security. With respect to climate security, the accelerating climate 
change impacts and growing pressure from youth climate activists in Europe may have 
contributed to recent efforts to combat climate change such as the EU ETS reforms in 
2019 (which led to the tripling of carbon prices), the phase-out of fossil fuel lending by 
EIB by end of 2021, the climate emergency declaration by the EU parliament and the 
proposal of European Green Deal aimed at ramping up climate mitigation efforts. As 
part of its strategy to reach its 2050 target to become carbon neutral, the EU have 
shown great interests in hydrogen and CCS applications in the transport, power and 
industrial sectors, which will likely drive the demand for both technologies and create 
new market opportunities for Norway.  
At the same time, energy security concerns due to the overdependence on 
energy imports for economic growth are one of the key motivations for increasing RE 
capacity and driving energy efficiency improvements in the EU. These factors will 
undoubtedly dampen the demand for oil and gas in Europe in the future. However, 
given the fact that the EU is currently not on track to meet most of its 2020 targets 
according to the European Environment Agency, the commitment level of the EU to 
achieve its 2050 climate goals is questionable. Moreover, the construction of the new 
gas pipeline connecting Russia to Germany raises the risk of a lock-in for continued 




 Half of the total value of Norway’s exports in 2018 was attributed to the crude 
oil and natural gas. Since oil production peaked in 2000, the contribution mix of natural 
gas to total oil and gas production has increased from 23% to around half since 2009 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019d). As domestic consumption of natural gas 
is limited, majority of the natural gas extracted is exported. While Norway is the world’s 
third largest natural gas exporter (in 2018), 95% of its exports is transported to the EU 
(UK 29%, Germany 39%, France 15%, Belgium 13%) through its 8 800 km subsea 
gas pipeline network (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2019d). As such, Norway is 
particularly sensitive to changes in EU’s energy system, especially concerning its gas 
exports which is more restricted geographically compared to oil exports due to 
transport challenges. In an attempt to secure the future of its gas exports, Norway 
have repeatedly employed discursive strategies to shape the public discourse into 
focusing on the lower carbon footprint of natural gas compared to coal (rather than RE 
sources) and the cost-effectiveness of natural gas in the decarbonisation of EU’s 
economy (Lien, Helgesen, & Aspaker, 2016). 
In the face of mounting scientific evidence of the threats of anthropogenic 
climate change, natural gas is increasingly being perceived negatively by Norwegian 
citizens (Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014) and was the cause of a political divide in the 
Norwegian parliament in the  mid 2000s. University applications for petroleum-related 
subjects, as a result, have reached all-time low, raising concerns for the lack of talents 
to replace an aging workforce in the oil and gas sector. To preserve the petro-industrial 
complex in the regime, the Norwegian government and the Equinor (the key regime 
actor), have stepped up the developments of low-carbon technologies like CCS and 
blue hydrogen. These technologies are considered symbiotic to the regime because it 
legitimises further offshore exploration in the Barents Sea and the continued reliance 
of natural gas in a carbon-constrained world. 
As natural gas is a finite resource, a move towards a low-carbon energy 
transition in Norway is inevitable once its reserves are depleted. According to the 
NPD’s 2018 estimates, natural gas production is expected to peak in the mid-2020s 
and natural gas from the undiscovered fields (half of which lies in the Barents Sea) is 
expected to start production as early as 2025 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
2019e). However, considering the challenging geological and weather conditions, as 
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well as the lack of infrastructure in the Barents Sea, the economic viability of offshore 
activities in this area is put in question. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 5.5, in 
a hypothetical situation where all the natural gas reserves in the discovered fields are 
successfully extracted and exported at the same rate as today, the natural gas 
reserves will last until 2036 and if the resources in the undiscovered fields are included, 
the reserves could last until 2052. This is an important consideration for the prospects 
of blue hydrogen since its production depends on natural gas input. 
Niche-innovation: 
Similar to fossil fuel exports, the prospects of large-scale hydrogen production 
in Norway will likely depend on the demand for hydrogen in the EU, which can vary 
between 20 MT to 57 MT in 2050 depending on the pace of energy transition. Since 
blue hydrogen is supported by Equinor, it is likely to benefit from lower internal natural 
gas prices which could lead to more competitive prices for blue hydrogen compared 
to that produced in the EU. Similarly, production cost of green hydrogen in Norway is 
likely to be cheaper than in the EU as a result of lower electricity prices, but it is unclear 
if it will still be the case after including the cost of storage, transport, and reconversion 
back to hydrogen (assuming ammonia is used as hydrogen carrier). 
Based on the production cost alone, blue hydrogen is 1.5 to 2 times cheaper 
than green hydrogen in Norway. Furthermore, from an export value chain perspective, 
blue hydrogen has a major advantage over green hydrogen because the site of 
production of blue hydrogen could be shifted from Norway to the importing country in 
the EU by transporting equipment for CCS. Due to the presence of fossil-based 
electricity sources in the electricity grid in the EU, and the highly prohibitive capital 
cost installing direct electrical connection with Norway (assumed to be not 
economically feasible within the period of analysis), it would be challenging for the 
hydrogen produced in the importing country to be certified as green.  
However, the prospects of blue hydrogen production hinges on the reserve 
level of natural gas resources in the NCS. As mentioned earlier under the regime 
dynamics, the prospects of finding new resources of natural gas for blue hydrogen are 
unclear and may entail higher costs compared to current natural gas extraction cost 
due to the lack of infrastructure. This adds to more incertitude in the viability of blue 
hydrogen production, especially if one considers the potentiality of increasing carbon 
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prices and possibility of a phase-out of blue hydrogen under an ambitious deployment 
of hydrogen in the EU. On the other hand, there is an abundant level of the natural 
resources (water and electricity) for green hydrogen production in Norway. 
As a symbiotic niche, blue hydrogen receives strong support from the current 
regime. In the case for green hydrogen, Equinor could potentially be one of the key 
actors, but it is dependent on the advancement of floating offshore wind developments 
in Norway, which unlike bottom-fixed offshore wind turbines, is not expected to reach 
maturity before 2040. Until then, the green hydrogen network in Norway is likely to be 
dominated by niche-actors such Yara before 2030, and eventually joined in by Green 
H2 Norway when the world’s first LH2 ocean tanker with a capacity of 160 000 m3 
becomes available from 2030 onwards (Harding, 2019). 
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7.1 Narratives of the four futures scenarios 
Before the construction of the narratives, an overview of the key characteristics 
of the four scenarios is summarised in the Table 8 below. Due to the uncertainties in 
each scenario, the unfolding of the pathways is assumed to be equally likely. 
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Transformation 
In addition, the following assumptions are applied across all the scenarios: 
1) A surplus of RE electricity of 80 TWh in Norway is available by 2050 driven by 
increased precipitation in hydropower plants, onshore wind installations which will 
peak in 2025, and offshore wind technology maturing in 2040 (refer to section 
5.4.1). 
2) Based on the current EU policies, the carbon prices in the EU ETS are expected 
to peak in 2023 at 35 EUR/tCO2e and end up at around 20 EUR/tCO2e in 2030 
(De Clara & Mayr, 2018). If the European Green Deal is adopted, carbon prices 
may rise up to 55 EUR/tCO2e by 2030 (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2018). 
3) Meeting the increase in demand for hydrogen in the EU is likely to require 
hydrogen imports due to competing demands for electricity generated from RE 
sources in the EU (in the case of green hydrogen) and existing dependence of 
natural gas imports (in the case of blue hydrogen). Hydrogen may initially  be 
imported in the form of ammonia as demand is expected to be still modest and 
specialised LH2 ocean tanker will not be ready before 2030 (FCH JU, 2019). 
 64 
4) The full-scale CCS demonstration project will be completed in 2024 and the 
Magnum project will be completed in 2023 as planned. Thus, theoretically 
speaking, market maturity could be achieved in the period between 2024 to 2030. 
5) The conversion of existing sub-sea natural gas pipelines is not considered in any 
of the scenarios due to the high costs for replacement and maintenance, as well 
as the complexity of coordinating between parties of both ends of the pipelines on 
the timing of conversion. 
6) Hydrogen transport via hydrogen pipelines in all scenarios is not feasible before 
2050 due to the high upfront capital costs which can only be justified with high 
stable hydrogen demand for at least 15-30 years. 
7) The export pathway for blue hydrogen is assumed to follow the model of the 
Magnum project, where natural gas is exported through existing gas pipelines to 
the country of the customer, and hydrogen is produced onsite vis ATR with CCS. 
The incumbent, Equinor is expected to play a key role in this pathway. 
8) The export pathway for green hydrogen assumes a centralised electrolysis-based 
production by Yara, and ammonia-based storage and transport, since it is the most 
cost-effective hydrogen carrier compared to CGH2 and LH2 before 2030. After 
2030, Green H2 Norway may emerge as a competitor to store and transport green 
hydrogen in the form of LH2. 
Global synergies scenario: High EU commitment & Low gas availability 
Under this scenario, the broader energy landscape is characterised by a strong 
commitment by the EU to align its current policies with the 2050 climate change goals 
to be carbon-neutral. This implies the adoption of the full program of the European 
Green Deal and the deployment of the water-electrolysis-dominant scenario under the 
EU Hydrogen Roadmap up to 2050, where political acceptance of CCS is assumed to 
be low, majority of the hydrogen is expected to be produced via water electrolysis from 
2030 onwards, and the cost of production is expected to be cheaper than blue 
hydrogen in the long-term (FCH JU, 2019). In addition, the annual demand for 
hydrogen in the EU is assumed to grow to 57 MT by 2050 (FCH JU, 2019). Meanwhile, 
the depletion of Norway’s natural gas resources obliges Norway to explore other 
market opportunities presented by the transition in the EU, leading to synergies of both 
economies. Against this background, the key drivers affecting the prospects of blue 
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and green hydrogen in Norway for energy export at the landscape, regime and niche 
levels may be presented as follows: 
Table 8: Global synergies scenario in 2050 from a MLP perspective 
MLP levels Key factors 
Landscape • Deep decarbonisation of the EU 
• Rising carbon prices in the EU 
• Cutback on fossil fuel funding by EIB 
• Demand for hydrogen increases gradually from 2025 onwards 
• Rising climate change awareness among youths in Norway 
Regime • Depletion of natural gas resources from 2023 onwards 
• Strong uncertainty over the future of oil and gas in Norway by 2023 
• Diversification of portfolio by incumbents 
Niche • Green hydrogen production technologies reach maturity by 2030 
• Infrastructure for hydrogen storage and export will be ready in 2030 
• Green hydrogen is expected to be more price-competitive than blue hydrogen 
by 2030 
Following the cutback on funding from EIB, offshore exploration projects in the 
Barents Sea are expected to face increased difficulties in attracting investment to build 
the necessary infrastructure. The oil and gas sector in Norway is also expected to face 
increasing pressure to keep the undiscovered resources in the ground as a result of 
growing climate change awareness among youths in Norway. Under these 
circumstances, hydrogen developments are likely to follow the MLP’s transformation 
pathway before 2030 due to the nascent state of the hydrogen market in EU. As more 
infrastructure are in place in the EU, the pathway may switch to the substitution 
pathway after 2030. 
Under the transformation pathway, the incumbent, Equinor realises that it 
needs to have a backup plan in anticipation of not finding new gas reserves in Norway 
by 2023, the critical timeline for current projections for gas productions up to 2035 to 
be feasible (Hall, 2018). This prompts Equinor to partially re-orientate itself to diversify 
its domestic portfolio by ramping up research developments in CCS in to produce blue 
hydrogen at large-scale for the growing demand in the EU before 2030, followed by a 
full orientation towards green hydrogen production based on energy generated from 
offshore wind technology. At the niche level, Yara partners up with NEL, the world’s 
biggest electrolyser producer, to develop the value chain for large-scale production of 
green hydrogen for the eventual export in the form of ammonia.  
A window of opportunity is expected to open up around 2030 when the energy 
regime in Norway is destabilized as a result of low availability of natural gas and the 
EU imposes restrictions on the import of blue hydrogen to allow only imports of green 
hydrogen. This pathway is similar to MLP’s substitution pathway where price and 
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performance improvements for green hydrogen export, as well as landscape pressure 
from the EU facilitate the dominance of green hydrogen export from Norway over blue 
hydrogen. As demand for hydrogen increases and large-scale LH2 ocean tankers 
become available around 2030, the green hydrogen market expects new entrants like 
Green H2 Norway to emerge and compete with Yara. Equinor is expected to join the 
competition in the green hydrogen export market from 2040 onwards when floating 
offshore wind turbines are commercially mature. 
Increased focus on CCS scenario: High EU commitment & High gas availability 
The narrative for the Increased focus on CCS scenario assumes similar 
landscape pressures from the EU as that of the Global synergies scenario, due to 
strong climate change commitment. As such, hydrogen deployment in EU is likely to 
follow the ambitious scenario of the Europe hydrogen roadmap, with annual demand 
reaching 57 MT by 2050 (FCH JU, 2019). Unlike in the previous scenario, Norway is 
expected to make new discoveries of commercial gas fields which delays the 
inevitable depletion of its reserves to beyond 2050. Faced with stricter restrictions on 
the import of fossil fuel in EU, the incumbent in Norway leverages on its lobbying power 
to persuade the EU to compromise for a SMR-/ATR-dominant scenario under its 
hydrogen roadmap for hydrogen production until 2050 (FCH JU, 2019). The scenario 
assumes a 85% mix of blue hydrogen and 10% mix of green hydrogen in 2050 for 
application in the power, heating and industrial sectors, whereas for the transport 
sector, the mix is equally split between blue and green hydrogen (FCH JU, 2019). 
Furthermore, CCS is assumed to be both feasible and politically acceptable, and blue 
hydrogen is expected to be cheaper than green hydrogen. Against this background, 
the key landscape, regime and niche factors in Norway energy export market are listed 
below: 
Table 9: Increased focus on CCS scenario in 2050 from a MLP perspective 
MLP levels Key factors 
Landscape • Deep decarbonisation of the EU 
• Rising carbon prices in the EU 
• Cutback on fossil fuel funding by EIB 
• Demand for hydrogen increases gradually from 2025 onwards 
Regime • Natural gas resources will last beyond 2050 
• Increased focus on CCS developments by incumbents  
• Strong support for blue hydrogen market by incumbents 
Niche • Green hydrogen production technologies reach maturity by 2030 
• Infrastructure for hydrogen storage and export will be ready in 2030 
• CCS reaches maturity earlier, before 2030 




The dynamics of the transition of the energy export market from fossil fuel-
based to hydrogen-based in Norway is assumed to follow the MLP’s transformation 
pathway until 2050. In this pathway, very few institutional changes will be expected 
and Equinor is expected to dominate the regime the whole period until 2050. Under 
moderate landscape pressures from the EU, a partial reorientation is expected to take 
place in the form of higher investments to speed up the maturity of CCS technology. 
In tandem, in anticipation of the falling demand of natural gas in the EU, more 
resources are allocated for the further expansion of Norway’s LNG export capacity in 
order to focus on the international LNG markets, particularly Asia where market prices 
are higher, and demand is expected to grow. 
While both blue and green hydrogen production technology reach commercial 
maturity at around the same time in 2030, export volumes of green hydrogen are 
expected to be modest throughout the period up to 2050 due to it being less price-
competitive than blue hydrogen. Green hydrogen will remain a niche until Equinor 
takes the lead to reorient the regime towards it when the full depletion of natural gas 
resources in NCS become apparent. 
Inevitable transition scenario: Low EU commitment & Low gas availability 
Underlying this scenario is the assumption that EU will miss the current 2030 
climate goals, making it very unlikely to achieve the climate goals of 2050. Taking a 
gradual approach in its energy system transition, the deployment of hydrogen in EU is 
likely to pursue the business-as-usual scenario where hydrogen demand in the EU 
reaches less than half of the two previous scenarios, with only 20 MT by 2050, and 
production process is dominated by SMR/ATR with CCS (FCH JU, 2019). On the other 
hand, as the EU policymakers plan a phase-out of coal plants which have become 
increasingly unprofitable due to falling LCOE of RE and rising carbon prices, natural 
gas demand is expected to increase. Since Norway fails to discover new gas 
resources to maintain the production levels at current rate, the natural gas resource 
levels are expected to decline from 2023 onwards. In anticipation of this, the EU 
reduces its imports from Norway and increasingly imports natural gas from other 
suppliers. The combination of these factors causes the regime to lose faith in the oil 
and gas sector by 2023, paving the way for MLP’s de-alignment and re-alignment 
pathway. The key drivers at each MLP levels are presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10: Inevitable transition scenario in 2050 from a MLP perspective 
MLP levels Key factors 
Landscape • EU misses its 2030 climate goals 
• Rising carbon prices in the EU forces coal plants to be phased out by 2030 
• Cutback on fossil fuel funding by EIB 
• Demand for hydrogen increases gradually from 2030 onwards 
• Rising climate change awareness among youths in Norway 
Regime • Depletion of natural gas resources from 2023 onwards 
• Regime lose faith in the Norwegian oil and gas sector by 2023 
• Struggles and tensions are expected between multiple groups and 
constituencies until new institutions are established to replace the old ones 
Niche • Competition intensifies between niche-innovations offering alternative energy 
export solutions 
• Green hydrogen production technologies reach maturity by 2030 
• Infrastructure for hydrogen storage and export will be ready in 2030 
• CCS reaches maturity in 2030 
• Blue hydrogen is expected to be more price-competitive than green hydrogen 
until 2050 
Following the de-alignment and re-alignment pathway, the destabilization of the 
oil and gas sector leads to a collapse of the regime, causing tensions and struggles to 
arise between various groups advocating for the rapid development of alternative 
niche-innovations to fill in the vacuum. These niche-innovations in RE export mainly 
consist of green hydrogen, onshore wind electricity and offshore wind electricity. 
Meanwhile, at the institutional level, the Norwegian government takes on an active 
role in lobbying for a faster energy transition in the EU so as to create market 
opportunities for its niche-innovations. 
Among all the niche-innovations, onshore wind is the most mature, but as 
mentioned in Section 6.4.1, major public protests against onshore wind are likely to 
prevent it from further development after 2025. Green hydrogen and infrastructure-
related technologies are expected to mature by 2030, whereas offshore wind 
electricity is likely to mature only in 2040. Based on this, green hydrogen has the 
highest potential to gain dominance before offshore wind, but export volumes will be 
limited due to the slow pace of energy transition in the EU. 
Slow transition scenario: Low EU commitment & High gas availability 
The slow transition scenario explores an energy future where the EU misses its 
climate targets for 2030 and the 2050 climate goals become unreachable. The 
deployment of hydrogen in EU is assumed to follow the business-as-usual scenario 
envisioned in its Hydrogen roadmap, with a modest annual demand of 20 MT by 2050, 
produced mainly via SMR/ATR with CCS (FCH JU, 2019). Meanwhile, Norway is 
expected to make new discoveries of commercial gas fields in the next five years, 
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which adds certainty that the natural gas resources will last beyond 2050. However, 
as a finite resource, the depletion of natural gas resources is only a matter of time and 
there is still a need for Norway to restructure its economy for a post-fossil fuel future. 
Against this background, the transition in Norway will likely follow the MLP’s 
transformation pathway but at a slower pace than the other scenarios, where fossil 
fuel export dominates the energy export market and institutional changes are minimal 
up to 2050. Table 11 highlights the key drivers affecting the development of hydrogen 
export in Norway at each of the MLP level. 
Table 11: Slow transition scenario in 2050 from a MLP perspective 
MLP levels Key factors 
Landscape • EU misses its 2030 climate goals 
• Rising carbon prices in the EU forces coal plants to be phased out by 2030 
• Cutback on fossil fuel funding by EIB 
• Demand for hydrogen increases gradually from 2030 onwards 
Regime • Natural gas resources will last beyond 2050 
• Prioritised allocation of resources for further offshore activities in the Barents 
Sea 
• Incumbents continues in investing in new niche-innovations for post-2050 
transition 
Niche • Green hydrogen production technologies reach maturity by 2030 
• Deployment of hydrogen storage and export infrastructure are expected only 
after 2040 
• CCS reaches maturity in 2030 
• Blue hydrogen is expected to be more price-competitive than green hydrogen 
until 2050 
Following a transformation pathway, Equinor is expected to continue investing 
in niche-innovations like CCS, blue hydrogen and offshore wind as part of its strategy 
to reorient its portfolio towards a post-2050 future with low oil reserves. However, the 
pace of reorientation may be slower than the other three scenarios as the development 
of fossil fuel infrastructure in the Barents Sea may be prioritised in terms of resource 
allocation over other technologies. 
In view of the limited demand of hydrogen imports in the EU, the market for 
hydrogen in Norway is likely to be dependent on domestic demand and the presence 
of a petro-industrial complex is likely to favour the prospects of blue hydrogen over 
green hydrogen. The deployment of green hydrogen infrastructure for storage and 
export may be delayed until floating offshore wind turbines reach technological 
maturity in 2040. In the meantime, green hydrogen will be produced to meet domestic 
refuelling needs of a small fleet of hydrogen trucks.  
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7.2 Prospects of blue and green hydrogen in Norway in 2050 for energy export 
Compared to the last wave of enthusiasm of hydrogen in mid-2000s in Norway, 
there has been a broadening of options for hydrogen applications across multiple 
sectors, as well as a variety of alternative options for its storage and transport. In 
particular, the possibility of using ammonia as a hydrogen carrier for storage and 
transport means that it is technically feasible to start exporting green hydrogen now, 
and that a large-scale export of hydrogen is foreseeable in the next 5 years. Several 
positive hydrogen-related news in the last 2 years show signs of acceleration in this 
area, such as the plans for large-scale electrolysis-based hydrogen plant in Norway, 
and the launch of the first ocean tanker for LH2. From a technological perspective, 
Norway is well-positioned to be a forerunner in this market. 
From an economic perspective, blue hydrogen is likely to grow more rapidly 
than green hydrogen in the short term. However, based on the estimated remaining 
reserves of natural gas in both discovered and undiscovered fields, Norway is likely to 
run out of its reserves faster than its competitors like Russia and Qatar. Hence, there 
is a need for Norway to strategize for an eventual phase-out of blue hydrogen in order 
to pave the way for green hydrogen and remain relevant as an actor in the global 
energy market. 
The different outcomes that arise from the four scenarios in the last section 
underline the significance of variations in the timing and nature of the interactions 
between the three MLP levels. Table 12 provides a summary of these different 
prospects. 
Table 12: Summary of prospects of hydrogen export in Norway 
Scenarios Summary of prospects of hydrogen export in Norway 
Global 
synergies 
• Diversification of regime portfolio with blue hydrogen export until 2030. 
• Substitution of both natural gas and blue hydrogen export by green 
hydrogen from 2030 onwards. 
Increased focus 
on CCS 
• Diversification of regime portfolio with blue hydrogen export until 2050 




• Collapse of the natural gas export regime by 2023 due to major internal 
problems. 
• Increased tensions and struggles between various groups until 2030. 
• Green hydrogen arises as the dominant energy export from 2030 onwards. 
Slow transition • Hydrogen export market is expected to be immature by 2050.  
• Limited production of both blue and green hydrogen until 2050 for domestic 
applications, with blue hydrogen dominating the market share. 
From the various pathways, it is observed that the green hydrogen is expected 
to play an increasingly dominant role in a low-carbon energy system and that the pace 
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of growth is dependent on the availability of natural gas reserves in the NCS. However, 
from a climate perspective, the Global synergies and Inevitable transition scenarios 
represent the highest possibility for achieving the GHG emission reduction targets, 
whereas the Slow transition scenario implies a delay in climate action and further 
acceleration of climate change impacts which could be irreversible. 
Furthermore, the Global synergies and Inevitable transition scenarios highlight 
the need for rapid development of floating offshore wind turbines by Equinor to mitigate 
the risk of lack of significant new discoveries in the NCS and the risk of drastic changes 
in the EU climate policies. Failure to do so could lead to the substitution of the regime 
actor by new entrants like Yara or Green H2 Norway. 
Before more investments is poured into further offshore activities, it is important 
to note that it takes 25 years for an industrial sector and all its value chain to be fully 
transformed (European Commission, 2019). Assuming that EU is highly committed to 
becoming carbon-neutral by 2050, drastic changes in its climate and energy policies 
should be expected in the next 5 years. Also, taking into consideration of the average 
lead time for developing new fields (16 years), there is a risk that the value of natural 
gas will be lower by the time the new fields are developed. 
In addition, it should be noted that a number of the technologies that are 
assumed to be technically available in the scenarios have not been commercially 
demonstrated at large-scale. In particular, the technical and economic viability of CCS 
applications in industrial sites have yet to be proven, and the closure of two natural 
gas power plants that attempted to implement CCS in Norway puts in question the 
cost advantage of blue hydrogen over green hydrogen production. 
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7.3 Recommendation for future research 
Given the complexities in the export value chain of hydrogen, the structure 
framework of PESTEL analysis was particularly useful for capturing the various 
uncertainties. At the same time, the categorical structure proves a little too rigid to link 
the key agencies in a chronological manner. This results in the weakening in the link 
between the findings from PESTEL analysis and the exploratory scenarios. The 
inclusion of interviews with key actors and experts in Norwegian energy policies and 
hydrogen developments for the construction of the narratives, could be one possible 
way to overcome this weakness. In addition, for a deeper understanding of the 
prospects of blue and green hydrogen, it would be useful to include an assessment of 




Due to the ubiquity of hydrogen and its versatile applications across sectors, 
blue and green hydrogen is expected to play a critical role in a low-carbon energy 
system in the next 30 years, especially if the EU is expected to be carbon neutral by 
2050. Since majority of Norway’s oil and gas exports are dependent on the EU, this 
will have serious implications for the future of its petroleum sector, notably for gas due 
to transport challenges. At the same time, the expectation of Norway’s natural gas 
production to peak in mid-2020s and the lack of significant discovery of new oil and 
gas fields add further uncertainties concerning future of its energy export market.  
On the other hand, the higher demand for hydrogen due to a deep 
decarbonisation of EU’s economy presents a great market opportunity for which 
Norway can tap into. For both blue or green hydrogen, Norway is well-positioned in 
terms of natural resources availability, existing compatible infrastructure and 
technological expertise, to become a market leader in the export of hydrogen.  
Based on the scenario analysis, the role of green hydrogen in a low-carbon 
energy system is likely grow more significantly as natural gas reserves in the NCS 
depletes. However, to maintain Norway’s role in EU’s energy system, it is critical to 
plan a strategy to phase out blue hydrogen and pave the way for increasing demand 
of green hydrogen in the EU since Norway is likely to run out of its natural gas reserves 
before its biggest competitors, Russia and Qatar. 
Overall, while blue hydrogen allows Norway to preserve its petro-industrial 
complex, it seems that green hydrogen offers better prospects for a more sustainable 
energy export regime. As Sir John Browne, the chief executive officer of British 
Petroleum in 1997 has famously said, “The time to consider the policy dimensions of 
climate change is not when the link between greenhouse gases and climate change 
is conclusively proven but when the possibility cannot be discounted and is taken 
seriously by the society of which we are part”(Romm, 2004, p. 134). Judging from the 
recent trends on EU energy politics and Norway’s petroleum reserves status, that time 
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